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Offices of Goodness: Influence without Authority in Federal Agencies 
 
By Margo Schlanger* 
 
Draft (September 9, 2013) 
PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE, OR DISTRIBUTE 
Introduction 
 
Inducing governmental organizations to do the right thing is the central problem of public 
administration.  Especially sharp challenges arise when “the right thing” means executing not 
only a primary mission but also constraints on that mission (what Philip Selznick aptly labeled 
“precarious values”1).  In a classic example, we want police to prevent and respond to crime and 
maintain public order, but to do so without infringing anyone’s civil rights.  In the federal 
government, if Congress or another principal wants an executive agency to pay attention not only 
to its mission but also to some other constraining or conflicting value—I will call that additional 
value, generically, “Goodness”2—that principal has several choices.  Congress can somehow 
impel the agency to try to seed the constraining value widely throughout its ranks—for example, 
by using supervision tools or incentives to get many agency employees to pay attention to 
Goodness.3  Or Congress can empower some other federal organization more closely aligned 
with Goodness to play an augmented role in the agency’s affairs.4  This Article addresses a third 
© Margo Schlanger 2013 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  I had the privilege of serving as the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties for two years beginning 2010 and as an advisor to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security in 2012 and some of 2013.  While those experiences obviously inform the views 
expressed here, those views are entirely personal and not in any way attributable to DHS.  Thanks to my University 
of Michigan colleagues for helpful comments on presentations of the idea underlying this article in both a Fawley 
workshop and governance lunch, to Tino Cuéllar, Liz Magill, Gillian Metzger, and Sallyanne Payton for their 
generous and generative conversations with me on the topic, to participants in the 2013 Law & Society Association 
panel in which I presented it (especially Tom Baker, the session’s discussant), and, as always, to Sam Bagenstos.  
All the primary documents cited below are attributed to their current locations on the Internet—but in order to 
preserve them for future years, I have assembled them and they are also posted at http://margoschlanger.net, in an 
Appendix to this Article.  [Not posted yet] 
1 See PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 119-33 (1957) 
2 I capitalize the term Goodness to indicate that the word is functioning as a stand-in for something of value, not 
as an endorsement of any particular normative judgment. 
3 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2009) (describing a “range of methods [to induce an agency to pursue a secondary 
goal”: changing the internal incentives structure of the agency by increasing the incentives provided for less 
measurable or otherwise secondary goals; working directly to change the mission of the agency through political and 
bureaucratic pressure; imposing procedures on the agency that require it explicitly to consider ‘secondary’ goals in 
its decision-making process; or hiring personnel in the agency who are professionally or personally committed to 
advancing one or more of the ‘secondary’ goals”). 
4 This approach is the subject of a rash of articles in the past several years examining the rationales and results of 
“overlapping” and “underlapping” jurisdiction among agencies.  See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and 
1 
 
                                                 
 
2
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 91 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/91
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2322797 
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
approach: furthering Goodness by giving it an institutional home, a subsidiary agency office I 
call an “Office of Goodness.”  Offices of Goodness have often been created by Congress when it 
has sought to instill in particular agencies values that are important to the moving Members but 
less than central to the agencies; presidents, too, have created them for a variety of political ends.  
 
Activities by Offices of Goodness possess a logic and function worthy of academic 
recognition and explication; both policymakers and scholars should care about how, and when, 
Offices of Goodness work.  But while Offices of Goodness are frequently established in federal 
agencies, they are all but invisible in scholarship.5  And the resulting knowledge gap is 
particularly problematic right now, because President Obama has just proposed a new Office of 
Goodness, within the National Security Agency, to increase oversight of surveillance activities.6    
An Office of Goodness’s success is far from guaranteed.  For such an Office to actually increase 
Goodness in its agency, its staff must skillfully use a toolkit constrained by the Office’s 
placement within the agency they seek to influence, and they must avoid the twin shoals of 
impotence or capture/assimilation.  This Article analyzes the relevant dynamics.  I begin by 
describing a paradigmatic Office of Goodness, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and four issues in which it was involved between 2009 and 
2012.  These examples then inform a more general discussion of available tools, and how the 
Office’s relationships with other stakeholders can increase or undermine its staff’s influence and 
commitment, which I suggest are the prerequisites for effectiveness.   
 
At an increased level of generality, the Article is in conversation with the “structure and 
process” strand of positive political theory.  The germinal articles in this literature were by the 
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency 
Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011); Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and 
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENV. L.J. 237 (2011); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
181 (2011); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 
(2012); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013). 
5 An extremely useful exception is Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in 
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2008), which analyses the Privacy Offices at DHS and the 
Department of State, and offers thoughts about why, faced with similar issues, the former managed a far more robust 
set of interventions in its agency than the latter.  It is, of course, also possible to find references here and there that 
acknowledge the strategy.  See, e.g., MARK H. MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL: 
JUNKYARD DOGS OR MAN’S BEST FRIEND (1986) (“In sum [in passing the 1978 Inspectors General Act], Congress 
chose the usual governmental response to an emerging political demand for some new purpose or value to be 
expressed in the operations of government—the creation of a separate, strengthened administrative unit whose 
primary goal is to advance the purpose or value that justified its creation.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: 
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 371 (1989) (“If the organization must perform a diverse 
set of tasks, those tasks that are not part of the core mission will need special protection. This requires giving 
autonomy to the subordinate tasks subunit (for example, by providing for them a special organizational niche) and 
creating a career track so that talented people performing non-mission tasks can rise to high rank in the agency.”). 
6 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-conference (explaining that the 
National Security Agency is “taking steps to put in place a full-time civil liberties and privacy officer”).  At the same 
press conference, the President also stated his support for a related, though slightly different, approach with respect 
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, proposing to work with Congress to “make sure civil liberties 
concerns have an independent voice in appropriate cases” in front of that court. Id. 
2 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
Schlanger:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
three collaborators known collectively as McNollgast;7 they argued that Congress can “stack the 
deck” in favor of agency outcomes it prefers, and facilitate its own focused oversight, by 
delineating the structure and process agencies must follow as they formulate policy.  Structure 
and process theorists have analyzed numerous delegation choices through this lens, including 
notice and comment rulemaking,8 choice of agency mission and jurisdiction9; use of “impact 
assessments,”10 and constraints on appointment and removal of personnel.11  Other political 
scientists studying agency design focus more on the president and less on Congress.12  Either 
way, as a prominent recent article by Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule summarizes,  
 
this literature for the most part treats “the agency” as a unit and asks how and why 
institutions such as Congress and the President impose various structural and procedural 
requirements on agencies. In other words, this literature (for the most part) asks how the 
black box should be shaped, not what lies inside it.13 
 
This Article (like Magill and Vermeule’s piece) takes as its subject the complex interactions 
among agency personnel inside that black box, and how those interactions are affected by and 
themselves affect outsiders.    
 
Scholarship written in the field of public administration or bureaucratic theory has a 
different blind spot.  Research about how bureaucracies work14 focuses almost entirely on 
7 Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J. L. & ECON. 243 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 341 (1989); see also Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994). 
8 See sources cited supra note 7. 
9 E.g., Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 4; Jonathan Macey, Organizational 
Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8  J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992). 
10 E.g., McNollGast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 7, at 263-266; see also Bamberger & Mulligan, 
Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5. 
11 See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of 
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008) (“By placing limits on the President’s power to appoint and 
remove independent agency heads as well as mandating limits on the number of the President’s own partisans that 
can be appointed, Congress made use of an institutional design that sought to limit presidential control of 
independent agencies.”).  For a guide to the public choice literature on agency design, see Jacob E. Gersen, 
Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne 
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
12 E.g., DAVID LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003). 
13 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011).  (The 
point essentially holds for David Lewis’s book, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design, supra note 12, 
because Lewis treats individual bureaus separately, rather than as parts of agencies. See infra note 21.)  Magill and 
Vermeule examined how administrative law doctrine empowers or disempowers particular actors within federal 
agencies. 
14 Classics include HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960); 
ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND 
APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM (1978); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL 
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, 
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operational bureaucracies—bureaus that themselves issue regulations or carry out programs, or 
offices that supervise such bureaus, not offices that operate by influence instead of chain-of-
command authority.15  Work in bureaucratic theory thus fails to offer a full account of the 
networks of authority and influence that comprise modern federal agencies.  This Article’s 
observations help to fill that gap, by focusing in particular on personnel who offer advice, rather 
than run agency operations, and elaborating some of the ways this distinction makes a difference. 
 
Part I sets the stage, identifying definitional features of an Office of Goodness, and 
describing the structure and authorities of the Office I know best.  For two years in the first term 
of the Obama Administration, I ran the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) as the presidentially appointed (but not Senate confirmed) 
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.  CRCL sits in the DHS Office of the Secretary; it 
employs about a hundred civil servants, who carry out tasks ranging from administration of the 
Department’s Equal Employment Opportunity program to civil rights inspection of immigration 
detention facilities to civil liberties review of classified information sharing agreements.16  In 
Part II, I turn to four important controversies in which CRCL was a participant:  the DHS role in 
information sharing relating to the Occupy movement; review of electronic device border search 
policy; Border Patrol’s policy relating to interpretation assistance for local law enforcement; and 
the inter-agency negotiation over guidelines governing data ingestion and retention by the 
National Counterterrorism Center.  (Of course the discussion here is my own and does not 
represent the views of the Department of Homeland Security or the Administration more 
generally.  Also, while whatever insight I can bring to bear is obviously inseparable from my 
own work history and experiences, all the information reported comes from publically available 
sources, which are cited.)  I tell these stories in some detail in order to ground the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
Part III increases the analytic altitude and analyzes more systematically the ways in 
which Offices of Goodness intervene in agency operations.  These interventions use a variety of 
methods, including: 
 
supra note 5.  Or, more recently, see, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE 
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989); AMY BETH ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999); DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001); 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law, in PREVENTING 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss 
eds. forthcoming); STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008); DANIEL P. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010).  Two sources providing helpful guides to the public 
choice part of the literature are Ronald Wintrobe, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 429 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997), and Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public 
Bureaucracy, in id., at 455. 
15 One insightful exception is ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980). 
16 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2011 
(2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/report-office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
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• Inclusion in policy formulation working groups 
• Clearance authority 
• Advice 
• Training and technical assistance 
• Program or operational review, including data analysis 
• Complaint investigation 
• Outreach to outside groups 
• Generation of documents 
• Congressional reporting 
 
Each method comes with its own risks and benefits, which are discussed. 
 
And increasing the elevation another 10,000 feet , in Part IV, I examine in more detail the 
relationships that either support or undermine Office influence and commitment to Goodness, its 
assigned value.  Both influence and commitment, I argue, are continually under threat, and both 
depend crucially on external reinforcement, whether from Congress, the White House, non-
governmental organizations, the courts, or other agencies.  Again, I develop the dynamics in 
some detail.   
 
It has recently become a commonplace observation that the power of the presidency has 
expanded to the point that tripartite separation of powers model, which relies on Congress and 
the courts to rein in the Executive Branch, may not be up to the task.  Much scholarship (and 
perhaps even practice) now emphasizes, instead or in addition, internal accountability 
mechanisms.17  Neal Katyal, for example, describes “internal separation of powers” methods, to 
“create checks and balances within the executive branch.”  He notes that “the apparatuses are 
familiar—separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by 
different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting requirements to 
Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.”18  Likewise, Jack 
Goldsmith celebrates “something new and remarkable:  giant distributed networks of lawyers, 
investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that rendered U.S. 
fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and 
political constraints, small and large, against them.”19   
 
Both scholars and the American polity, would, to quote Gillian Metzger, “benefit[] from paying greater attention to internal administrative design, and in particular . . . analyzing 
17 As Gillian Metzger emphasizes, the various internal and external methods interact crucially.  See Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 
426 (2009).  See also, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006) (analyzing the structure of federal 
intelligence offices); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the 
Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009) (analyzing the structure of the Federal Security 
Agency). 
18 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 
115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006) 
19 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at xi-xii (2012).   
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what types of administrative structures are likely to prove effective and appropriate in different contexts.”20  In my view, the Office of Goodness strategy, already used by Congress 
and other principals, can be at least partially effective and appropriate.  It is the ambition of this 
Article to raise the strategy’s visibility, placing it more prominently on the menu of internal 
separation of powers devices for it to be further analyzed and assessed.   
I. What is an Office of Goodness?   
A. Key Characteristics 
 
By “Office of Goodness” I mean an office within an operational agency that has each of 
three features: 
 
First, Offices of Goodness are advisory rather than operational.  Offices of Goodness 
help other parts of the agency get work done; they are not the offices (or bureaus, to use the 
nomenclature most common in scholarship21) that themselves carry out the agency’s mission.  
This means that Offices of Goodness must operate by persuasion or coercion of others.  
Scholarship examining the dynamics of bureaucratic autonomy is highly relevant by analogy,22 
but for Offices of Goodness, power lies less in autonomy than in influence—the ability to thwart 
another office’s autonomy.23  
Second, Offices of Goodness are value-infused.24  The observations here apply to offices 
that are explicitly assigned to further a particular value that is not otherwise primary for the 
agency in which they sit.  That value could be civil rights, consumer welfare, fiscal rectitude, etc.  
The Article calls it Goodness, but is agnostic on whether Goodness is actually good.  A note in 
this regard: Where the value in question is “lawfulness,” the Office of Goodness is likely to be 
the agency’s Office of General Counsel.  Jack Goldsmith writes, for example, of “the CIA’s 150 
or so lawyers,” naming them the “street-level bureaucrats” responsible for enforcing 
“compliance with the bevy of laws that Congress imposes and that the executive branch 
20 Metzger, supra note 17. 
21 See LEWIS, supra note 12, at 41 (“‘Bureau’ is a general term that refers to many different sub-units within 
larger departments that have different names such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, 
or National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  Like departments, bureaus vary in size and significance.  In 
many departments the sub-department bureaus have significant autonomy and authority; many departments are 
better characterized as holding companies of a number of distinct agencies rather than one large agencies.  The 
autonomy of sub-department agencies derives from a number of sources.  Most have legal authority delegated to the 
bureau chief directly by legislation, rather than to the department secretary or the President.  Large bureaus are also 
generally headed by Senate-confirmed political appointees, making bureau chiefs accountable to congressional 
committees directly rather than through higher departmental officials.”). 
22 The leading source on agency autonomy and the techniques used to obtain and sustain it is DANIEL P. 
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS 
IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2002). 
23 See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 150-152 (1987) (analyzing persuasion in 
federal agencies). 
24 Cf. PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1957).  
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translates into more detailed executive orders, regulations, and directives.”25  Valuable (though 
limited) work has been done on general counsels’ offices26; this Article builds on that 
scholarship, adding detailed description of an Office of Goodness that is not an Office of General 
Counsel, and also moving up one level of generality, to think about this type of office as an 
analytic category. 
Third, Offices of Goodness are internal and dependent on their agency.  The dynamics of 
a fully internal office are very different from one that has structural separation and independence.  
I deal here with non-independent internal offices, although of course independence is not 
dichotomous but rather exists along a spectrum.27  In my view, this is why the burgeoning work 
on the far more independent offices of Inspectors General is enlightening but distinct.  As that 
work describes, notwithstanding their organizational chart placement, Inspectors General have, 
at least since 1978, answered much more to Congress than to their Department heads.28   
B. What is the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties? 
 
The head of the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties (CRCL)—a presidential appointee reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security—is required by Congress to “oversee” DHS “compliance with constitutional, statutory, 
regulatory, policy, and other civil rights and civil liberties requirements.” 29  The relevant statutes 
25 GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 19, at 93.  See also, e.g., Afsheen John Radsan, Sed Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? 2 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 201 (2008). 
26 For analysis of the dynamics of federal Offices of the General Counsel, see, for example, sources cited supra 
note 25; Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991); 
Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 13, at 1032, 1058-62, 1072-73; Harold Hongju Koh & Aaron 
Zelinsky, Practicing International law in the Obama Administration, 35 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 4 (2009); Laura A. 
Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2010) (about Judge Advocate General’s Corps lawyers). 
27 See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Lisa S. Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010); Marshall J. Breger & Gary Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000).   
28 See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 
STAN. L. REV. (2013); Ryan M. Check & Afsheen J. Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA’s Inspector 
General, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247 (2010); Kathryn E. Newcomer, The Changing Nature of Accountability: 
The Role of Inspector General in Federal Agencies, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 129 (1998); Michael R. Bromwich, 
Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027 (1998); PAUL C. LIGHT, 
MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  (1993); INSPECTORS 
GENERAL: A NEW FORCE IN EVALUATION (Michael Hendricks et al. eds., 1990); Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie F. 
Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. 
REV. 473 (1984). CARMEN R. APAZA, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: HOMELAND SECURITY 
AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (2011); MOORE & GATES, supra note 5.  
29 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 705, 116 Stat. 2135, 2219-20 (codified as 
amended at 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)), amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 
108-458, sec. 8303, § 705(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3867; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1; Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, sec. 803, § 1062, 121 Stat. 266, 360-362.  The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 established the office and directed the Secretary to appoint its head, who was instructed much 
more briefly to “review and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic 
profiling by employees and officials of the Department.”  Pub. L. 107-296, Sec. 705, 116 Stat 2135, 2220 (2002). 
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empower the office to deal with both general policy development and review, and with more 
specific (and individual) civil rights complaints.  CRCL’s statutes instruct the office to assist the 
Secretary and Department offices in policy development and implementation, including by 
periodically reviewing policies and procedures “to ensure that the protection of civil rights and 
civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs and activities.”  The 
statutes also require the office to review and assess information and investigate complaints 
concerning civil rights and civil liberties abuses by DHS employees—including, explicitly called 
out by statute—alleged “profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion.” In addition, CRCL 
is required to more generally “ensure that [the Department] has adequate procedures to receive, 
investigate, respond to, and redress” civil liberties complaints.30   
 
So that CRCL can carry out these tasks, the Secretary is instructed to ensure that the 
CRCL Officer:  
 
“(1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill the functions of such 
officer; 
“(2) is advised of proposed policy changes; 
“(3) is consulted by decision makers; and 
“(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to be necessary to 
carry out the functions of such officer.”31 
 
And, crucially, Office is subjected to specific congressional reporting obligations.  The CRCL 
Officer is required to file quarterly Congressional reports about the office’s activities, including, 
most importantly, “the type of advice provided and the response given to such advice;” and “a 
summary of the disposition of . . . complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the 
impact of the activities of such officer.”32  Correspondingly, the Secretary is required to file an 
annual congressional report “detailing any allegations of [civil rights or civil liberties] abuses . . . 
of this section and any actions taken by the Department in response to such allegations.”33 
 
Congress has also made subsequent more specific use of CRCL and its head, instructing 
the Secretary to “consult” with the CRCL Officer in developing several specified programs,34 
requiring CRCL to develop or certify civil liberties training for particular personnel,35 and asking 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a)(4). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(d).   
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(f)(2)(D). 
33 6 U.S.C. § 345(b). 
34 See 6 U.S.C. § 124h (requiring the Secretary to consult with the CRCL Officer in establishing a DHS Fusion 
Center Initiative); 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (requiring the same in carrying out certain public transportation research and 
development projects); 6 U.S.C. § 1168 (requiring the same for railroad security research and development); 6 
U.S.C. § 1185 (requiring the same for bus security research and development).  
35 See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring each DHS officer or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center 
to undergo civil liberties training “developed, supported, or sponsored by . . . the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties of the Department”); 6 U.S.C. § 124(i) (same for Information Sharing Fellows). 
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for CRCL-authored reports both before and after programs are implemented.36  In addition, DHS 
Secretaries have publically assigned a variety of tasks to CRCL, declaring the office responsible 
for training, policy assessment and recommendations, and particular participation in specified 
Departmental tasks and processes.  Several of these are discussed in part I.C, below. 
 
CRCL is very different from the civil rights offices of most federal agencies.  In contrast 
with CRCL’s inward-looking advisory/review/watch-dog function, most agency offices of civil 
rights (OCRs) combine a more substantively limited role inside the agency—administering equal 
employment opportunity programs—with a more operational regulatory role outside the 
agency—enforcing the antidiscrimination obligations of supported organizations.37  (The 
Department of Agriculture’s Civil Rights Office, described in the Border Patrol Interpretation 
section below (part I.b.3), is a partial exception from this general pattern.  And the most well-
known of the federal civil rights offices, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division is 
different altogether; as a litigating office of the Justice Department, its primary mission is to sue 
non-federal defendants, so it is nearly entirely outwardly focused.)  But while DHS CRCL is 
unusual among cabinet department civil rights offices, it is far from unique in its structure.  
DHS’s foundational 2002 statute birthed not only CRCL but its DHS sibling, the Privacy Office, 
along similar lines.38  And a 2007 statute that confirmed and expanded CRCL’s authority 
similarly either confirmed or led to the creation of analogous offices—although generally 
combining privacy and civil liberties, and not mentioning civil rights—within the Departments 
of Justice, Defense, State, Treasury, Health and Human Services, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.39  The structure of each office 
varies; some are led by presidential appointees, others by political appointees who must be 
approved by the Presidential Personnel Office but are technically appointed by the Department 
Head; still others are led by career staff.40  Expanding the field of vision beyond either civil 
36 See 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (requiring the CRCL Office to conduct appropriate reviews of certain DHS public 
transportation research and development projects), 6 U.S.C. § 1168 (same, for railroad security research and 
development), 1185 (same, for bus security research and development); Pub. L. No. 110-53 (not codified in 
pertinent part), §§ 511 (requiring the CRCL Officer to submit a report to Congress and others on the civil liberties 
impact of the Fusion Center Initiative), 512 (same for Information Sharing Fellows Program), 521 (same for 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group), 1523 (same for Northern Border Railroad Passenger 
program). 
37 See, e.g., Stephen C. Halpern, On the Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act (1995) (describing operations of Education OCR); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights 
Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath 
of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 215 (2003) (same for HHS OCR); Olatunde 
Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101 (2012) 
(same for HUD Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS, HOW 
PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989) (same for Health, Education and Welfare OCR).  
38 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296,  Sec. 222, 116 Stat 2135, 2155 (2002) (codified as 
amended at 6 U.S.C. §142); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-2.   
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a); see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-
458, §§ 1011, 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3658-59, 3688 (creating a Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of 
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rights or civil liberties, offices that satisfy the three “Offices of Goodness” criteria set out above 
are scattered throughout government.  They have titles like the Department of Energy’s Office of 
Economic Impact and Diversity, or the Internal Revenue Service’s Office of the Taxpayer 
Advocate.41  Many are called Ombudsman’s offices.42  It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
either catalog or discuss all of these offices—the point here is only that their use by Congress is a 
general regulatory strategy worthy of analysis.   
II. What do Offices of Goodness Do?  Four CRCL Vignettes. 
 
In this section, I describe four civil rights controversies in which CRCL played a role,43 
to thicken the description of available strategies and challenges.  I look in turn at (1) the DHS 
role in information sharing relating to the Occupy movement in late 2011; (2) DHS electronic 
device border search policy; (3) Border Patrol’s policy relating to interpretation assistance for 
Northern Border law enforcement agencies; and (4) the inter-agency negotiation over guidelines 
governing data retention by the National Counterterrorism Center.   For each controversy, the 
narrative mentions the relevant tools, which are discussed more thoroughly in Part III. 
A. DHS and Occupy  
 
September 2011 saw the birth of the Occupy Wall Street protest movement in New York 
City; over subsequent weeks and months, Occupy grew and spread across the country.  In many 
cities, Occupy began that fall with live-in encampments in parks and other public spaces.  Nearly 
everywhere, city governments and law enforcement eventually enforced various curfew and anti-
camping rules and shut down the Occupy camps.  The Department of Homeland Security was 
involved in several ways.  Occasionally a unit of DHS was a target of a protest.  For example, an 
“Occupy Stewart” protest was held in November 2011 in front of the Stewart Detention Center, 
40 For example, the Defense Department’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy, and Civil Liberties Officer is a 
career member of the armed services.  See Michael L. Rhodes, Director of Administration and Management, 
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=164; Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, 
http://dpclo.defense.gov/civil/About_The_Office/dpclo_structure.html#leadership.  The Department of Justice Chief 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer is a political appointee.  And the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
Civil Liberties Protection Officer is a career civil servant.   
41 For a discussion of the IRS Office of Taxpayer Advocate, see IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, OVERSIGHT OF THE 
OFFICE OF TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND ACTIONS (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/taxpayer_advocate_oversight.pdf (last visited August 16, 2013).   
42 Outward-facing ombudsman’s offices are embedded, for example, in, inter alia, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of 
Public Engagement; Consumer Product Safety Commission, Office of Education, Global Outreach and Small 
Business Ombudsman; and Small Business Administration.  DHS also has a freestanding Ombudsman for 
Citizenship and Immigration Services.  For background, see The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies, Admin. Conf. of 
the United States, Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2 (1993); Office of the Chairman, Administrative 
Conference of the United States, The Ombudsman: A Primer for Federal Agencies (1991).  On internal federal 
ombudsman’s offices, for workers, see Leah Meltzer, The Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 549, 559-97 (1998). 
43 My own personal involvement in three of these controversies appears in the documents cited, however, I 
played no direct role in the Occupy issue. 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
11
Schlanger:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
an immigration detention facility in Lumpkin, Georgia.44  The Coast Guard and CBP (and to a 
lesser extent ICE) also monitored what was going on at several sea port protests, which had the 
potential of affecting their operations.45  And DHS’s Federal Protective Service, which is the law 
enforcement agency with responsibility for most of the nation’s federal buildings, took note of 
protests in the vicinity of those buildings46 and was the agency that enforced encampment 
prohibitions in (apparently) one location.47   
 
For the Federal Protective Service and for state and local law enforcement (often working 
through “fusion centers,” entities that are not part of the federal government, but are partially 
funded by, and networked with, DHS), the civil liberties challenge was to maintain “situational 
awareness,”—that is, knowledge of what was going on sufficient to facilitate appropriate police 
planning and presence—without crossing over into more intrusive and objectionable monitoring 
of First Amendment protected protest activity.48  Scattered throughout thousands of pages of 
relevant documents obtained via Freedom of Information Act request from DHS by Truthout, a 
non-profit independent news organization,49 is evidence of efforts to meet that challenge.  For 
example, one document describes the stance of the Northern California Regional Intelligence 
Center (NCRIC), a fusion center in San Francisco:  “Other than a few smashed windows at a 
number of banks, today’s events have remained First Amendment protected activities.  NCRIC is 
not monitoring protected activity, but is in touch with the Oakland EOC in the event 
circumstances change.”50  And when in October 2011, a report summarizing the Occupy protests 
to date and attributed to the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of 
Infrastructure Protection was posted (and then reported and reposted on Rolling Stone’s blog 
site); the report was immediately pulled down; senior Department officials explained it was 
unauthorized and out of compliance with DHS policy.51  
44 Jim Mustian, Crowd Calls for Closing of Stewart Detention Center; Two Arrested, GA. LEDGER-ENQUIRER 
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/2011/11/18/1824958/crowd-calls-for-closing-of-stewart.html. 
45 See E-mails Among DHS Staff  During November and December 2011, in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT 
RESPONSE 95, 197, 292-94, 305-07, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/353138-latest-batch-of-dhs-occupy-
documents-contains.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (discussing protests at several sea ports in November and 
December 2011). 
46 See Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at Occupy Wall Street 
and Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/15389-newly-released-dhs-
emails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-in-violence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york (citing DHS 
FOIA Request, http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/625736-ows-nppd-region-1-final.html (last visited Aug. 
13, 2013)). 
47 See, e.g., E-mail from DHS spokesman Chris Ortman to DHS Secretary’s Office staff, Nov. 1, 2011, in 
5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 45 (statement on the record describing FPS role in 
Portland Schrunk Plaza arrests). 
48 S. SELECT COMM. STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS, 2 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, 
S. DOC. NO. 94-755, at 221 (2d Sess. 1976).  
49 See Jason Leopold, DHS Turns Over Occupy Wall Street Documents to Truthout, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://truth-out.org/news/item/8012-dhs-turns-over-occupy-wall-street-documents-to-truthout#files.   
50 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 95.  
51 The report remains available at http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/13637_DHS%20IP%20Special.pdf.  The 
back and forth on pulling it down is discussed in email traffic FOIA’d and posted by Truthout.  See Jason Leopold, 
Top DHS Officials Went Ballistic Over Rolling Stone Contributor Michael Hasting’s OWS Report, Internal Emails 
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Even situational awareness activities received some criticism from the civil liberties 
left—an article in Salon, for example, described them as a “policy of daily spying on activists”52; 
this was then described on the New York Times website by a civil liberties advocate as 
“inappropriate surveillance of protesters associated with Occupy Wall Street.”53  But such 
criticism fails to engage the reasonable needs of law enforcement agencies with responsibilities 
for federal buildings.  It’s not obviously unreasonable for Federal Protective Service personnel to 
notice who is planning large events near the buildings they protect; in fact, it might be 
irresponsible for police not to notice such events.   
 
Units of DHS designated to help “fuse” information for many law enforcement 
agencies—the DHS National Operations Center and also DHS intelligence analysts assigned to 
the fusion centers—did not have such situational awareness needs.  Accordingly, the challenge 
for them was a little bit less challenging; because their mission is more limited (covering 
homeland security matters, only) a cleaner solution is possible.  For example, when Chicago’s 
police department asked the National Operations Center to circulate to law enforcement in seven 
other cities an “RFI” (Request for Information) on Occupy encampments and arrests,54 that 
request was first distributed but then quickly recalled by top management, who explained: “DHS 
I&A [Office of Intelligence & Analysis] personnel—both at Headquarters and in the field—may 
NOT be engaged in any efforts to gather information on First Amendment-protected activities 
that have no direct nexus to violence or that are otherwise outside the scope of DHS I&A 
authorities.  Such inquiries should be strictly limited to law enforcement channels.”55 
 
So far I’ve quoted various DHS actors’ nods towards First Amendment values.  But what 
about CRCL?  CRCL’s involvement had several related strands, described below.  CRCL’s 
training role may have raised awareness of First Amendment red flags, and also ratified CRCL’s 
role and expertise.  In addition, CRCL used that role and expertise to explain and underscore the 
importance of avoiding First Amendment infringements.  And finally, in some limited situations, 
CRCL had clearance authority, so that CRCL approval was more or less required for 
promulgation of a document.   
 
Training.  In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
Congress required that each DHS officer or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center 
undergo civil liberties training “developed, supported, or sponsored” by CRCL.56  The same law 
Show, TRUTHOUT (July 31, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item/10634-dhs-on-rolling-stone-reporter-michael-
hastingss-ows-report-he-can-be-provocative-help-him-understand-our-mission.  The emails themselves are posted at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/405431/ows-final-release-package-part2.pdf, at 78, 94. 
52 Natasha Lennard, DHS Had Policy of Daily Spying on Activists, SALON (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/04/03/dhs_had_policy_of_daily_spying_on_activists. 
53 Jameel Jaffer, Privacy is Worth Protecting, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013, 10:00:00 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-or-imagined.  
54 See E-mails from Chicago Police Department Officials to Other Police Department Officials, in 5/3/2012 DHS 
FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 245-57. 
55 E-mails from [redacted] to [redacted],  in id. at 251, 266, 270. 
56 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
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likewise required that each fusion center provide “appropriate privacy and civil liberties training” 
for all personnel, “in coordination with” both the DHS Privacy Office and CRCL.57  The training 
provided is limited: CRCL gives the DHS intelligence analysts just a few hours’ overview of 
civil rights and civil liberties background, and trains trainers (and provides materials) for the 
fusion center personnel.  Critics have suggested this is inadequate58—although perhaps it is 
sufficient for raising awareness, if not for creating experts.  In any event, the training 
requirement does introduce each of the intelligence analysts to the existence and role of CRCL.  
The results are evident in the Occupy FOIA document in one email from an employee at the 
Office of Intelligence & Analysis to a National Operations Center intelligence analyst, who had 
received a law enforcement request for information about Occupy protests.  The email warned:  
 
[P]lease be very cautious in responding to requests related to constitutionally protected 
activities.  Feel free to reach out to our CR/CL office if you have any doubt when asked 
to support requirement[s] you feel are questionable prior to taking any action.”59   
 
Similarly, after Pittsburgh’s municipal Office of Emergency Management and Homeland 
Security (not part of DHS) distributed a “Threat Assessment” about Occupy Pittsburgh,60 two 
DHS employees who saw this document became concerned that it “might be advocating 
surveillance and other countermeasures to be employed against activities protected under the 1st 
Amendment,” and contacted CRCL to seek some kind of responsive training document “so that 
in the future they [the local authors of the Threat Assessment] have a greater awareness of how 
to develop intelligence assessments that don’t undermine Constitutionally protected speech and 
assembly rights.”61   
 
Technical assistance.  More directly within DHS’s own walls, staff from DHS’s Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis explained in an October 17 email that they were receiving numerous 
“questions and requests for information regarding Occupy Wall Street from a number of 
component partners and intelligence officers.”  The email explained their first answer: 
“Recognizing that this is a first amendment-protected activity, we have recommended (on an ad 
hoc basis when we received requests) that our Intelligence Officers refer inquiries to Fusion 
Centers and avoid the topic altogether.”  But the email requested more formal guidance from 
CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office.62 
 
57 6 U.S.C. § 511(a). 
58 See, e.g., S. PERM. SUBCOMM. INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, FEDERAL 
SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 49 (Oct. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-and-involvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-
centers.   
59 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 188.   
60 Pittsburgh Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security FOIA Response, 
http://nigelparry.com/enginefiles/uploads/occupyassessment.pdf (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013). 
61 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1) 2, http://truth-
out.org/files/12-0048-First-Interim-Release_OWS_Part1.pdf (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013). 
62 See E-mail from Shala Byers to [redacted], in id. at 5.  
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Privacy Office and CRCL staff explained to the Office of Intelligence & Analysis 
manager who requested the guidance that simply referring the inquiries to Fusion Centers might 
“give the appearance that DHS is attempting to circumvent existing restrictions, policies, and 
laws.”  The right approach, they argued, was that “DHS should not report on activities when the 
basis for reporting is political speech,” and should “also be loath to pass DHS requests for more 
information on the protests along to the appropriate fusion centers without strong guidance that 
the vast majority of activities occurring as part of these protests is protected.”  Not that there was 
a ban on reporting:  “Persons demonstrating illegal or suspicious behavior and attempting to use 
the protests to obscure their activity could be reported, as long as there is no attempt to link the 
suspicious/illegal behavior to first amendment protected activity.”63   
 
 The FOIA’d emails include resulting guidance promulgated by Office of Intelligence & 
Analysis leadership to DHS intelligence analysts.  It stated:   
 
Activities such as speech and assembly (both of which are implicated in the planned 
“occupy” protests) are protected by the First Amendment and generally DHS would not 
collect information or report on these types of activities unless we had a compelling 
interest to do so. Below is some general guidance that we hope you find helpful. 
• The government may never collect or disseminate information based solely on 
First Amendment protected activities, or conduct investigations on that basis. 
• Generally, reporting should be about the violence or criminality of a particular 
individual or group. Reporting on activities without a nexus to violence or 
criminality often raises First Amendment concerns. 
o To justify research into and creation of a product containing First 
Amendment-protected activity, personnel should consider whether they 
have a lawful predicate (e.g. a lawful purpose to perform their authorized 
law enforcement functions or other activities, that is not based on the 
protected activity itself). 
o Once a lawful predicate has been established, personnel should ensure the 
scope of the research and reporting on First Amendment-protected activity 
is limited to the threat posed. This is often referred to as congruence. 
• The treatment of groups that may be involved in the First Amendment protected 
activity or related events should be even-handed and free of bias (e.g., not 
reporting more extensively or negatively on one group based on their viewpoint 
alone). 
 
The email closed with an expression of collegiality:  “Please let us know if you have any other 
questions, or if you require CRCL support in any other way. The CRCL office has been 
extremely helpful and responsive on this issue and they stand ready to assist.”64 
 
The emails include other evidence of more particularized advice seeking and giving.  One 
episode involved a DHS intelligence analyst who asked about an incident in which an SUV was 
63 E-mail from Privacy office staff to [redacted], id. at 85. 
64 Id.  
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set on fire.  He explained: “I ran across this today and was interested in a possible write up of the 
event for the state and locals. Before I spent the time writing on this, however, I’d like to know 
what objections CRCL might pose to such a product concerning the Occupy movement—which 
has thus far been nonviolent.”65  The email chain includes debate among CRCL staff members 
about whether any reporting on the incident, at all, would be appropriate in light of the DHS 
mission.  What was sent back to the intelligence analyst notes that CRCL was:  
 
particularly concerned about attribution of the incident. The article notes that the police 
say they don’t know who set the fire or why they did it, and while some of the graffiti 
contains slogans consistent with some of the Occupy movement’s protests, the police say 
it would be ‘unfair to blame any one group’ for the incident, and the spokesperson for 
Occupy Eugene denounced the event and said it was not part of their tactics. Unless there 
is other intelligence that indicates that the vandalism can be attributed to the group, the 
product would have to be very careful not to attribute the incident to the movement.”  
Accordingly, “If I&A believes the incident in Eugene merits nationwide reporting, it 
would be preferable for I&A to write up the incident in a manner that takes care not to 
attribute the action to Occupy (absent further information), rather than to write a general 
product about Occupy and add to that product a write-up of the incident (as the context of 
the product would make it difficult to convey that we have no information that the 
incident may be fairly attributed to Occupy, rather than someone merely sympathetic to 
their ideology). Generally, it would be difficult for DHS to justify a product on the 
Occupy movement at this time. As you note, the movement has been largely non-violent, 
and what criminal activity has taken place has mostly been of the civil disobedience 
variety (failure to secure/overstaying permits, non-violent resistance to arrest), with 
occasional violent resistance to being removed from a location/arrested, etc., and it is 
unclear what is appropriately attributable to the Occupy movement versus individuals 
who may later enter into a conflict with policy. Other concerns appear to be health and 
safety related (use of heating equipment, disposal of trash, etc). As these concerns 
generally are localized and not related to domestic terrorism, to our knowledge, it would 
be difficult for DHS to justify a product on what is largely First Amendment protected 
activity that doesn’t appear to have a nexus to a DHS mission.   
 
The intelligence analyst decided not to write the report. 
 
Clearance authority.  CRCL had not always played this influential a role in intelligence 
reporting at DHS.  In fact, in April 2009, an Office of Intelligence & Analysis report on “Right-
Wing Extremism”66 was issued over CRCL’s objection.67  The report was marked “For Official 
65 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], id. at 13. 
66 See DEPT. HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (Apr. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf.    
67 See Tom Brune, Analysts Ignored Objections on Extremism Report, Official Confirms, NEWSDAY (Apr. 17, 
2009); Daryl Johnson, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE: HOW A DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT IS BEING IGNORED (2012). 
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Use Only”68 but was widely distributed to law enforcement agencies, and promptly leaked and 
posted online.69  Defining right-wing extremism to include groups “that are mainly 
antigovernment, rejecting federal authority in favor of state or local authority, or rejecting 
government authority entirely,” as well as “groups and individuals that are dedicated to a single 
issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration,” it warned that gun control opponents and 
veterans were plausible recruits to violent extremism, and cast aspersions on Republicans more 
generally by stating that opposition to the Obama administration’s policy positions was 
“galvaniz[ing]” extremists.70 The resulting furor from conservative constituencies,71 and then 
from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress,72 considerably enhanced CRCL’s authority; 
the Secretary apologized to veterans for the report73 and an internal directive was issued 
requiring clearance of all non-classified intelligence analysis by CRCL personnel, as well as by 
Privacy and the Office of the General Counsel.  The clearance authority was not absolute, but to 
issue a document over the leadership-level objection of one of those offices, Intelligence & 
Analysis was required to appeal to the Deputy Secretary—a significant augmentation of the 
reviewing offices’ influence.74   
 
Returning to the Occupy issue, what’s notable in the Occupy FOIA releases is that there 
is no evidence of an actual DHS intelligence report about Occupy.  This kind of product would 
68 The FOUO designation was supposed to bar distribution outside of the government.  See Department of 
Homeland Security, Management Directive 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use 
Only) Information, Jan. 6, 2005, available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_110421_safeguarding_sensitive_but_unclassified_informa
tion.pdf.  It has since been officially supplanted by the designation “Controlled Unclassified Information.”  See 
Controlled Unclassified Information, Executive Order 13556 (Nov. 4, 2010).     
69 The leak was to Rodger Hedgecock.  The story is told in DARYL JOHNSON, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE: HOW A 
DOMESTIC TERROR THREAT IS BEING IGNORED (2012), written by the intelligence analyst who drafted the Right-
Wing Extremism paper.   
70 Id. at 2-3. 
71 See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, Confirmed: The Obama DHS Hit Job on Conservatives is Real, MICHELLE MALKIN 
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://michellemalkin.com/2009/04/14/confirme-the-obama-dhs-hit-job-on-conservatives-is-real, 
(“the piece of crap report issued on April 7 is a sweeping indictment of conservatives”).  Numerous organizations 
responded by calling for the removal of Secretary Napolitano.  She responded with an apology and a promise to 
revamp the intelligence product clearance process, including by augmenting the authority of CRCL.  Jackie 
Kucinich, Napolitano Atones for DHS Report, ROLL CALL (May 7, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_127/-34696-1.html.  
72 See, e.g., Letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson to Secretary Janet Napolitano (April 14, 2009), 
http://www.yallpolitics.com/images/ThompsonLetter041609.pdf (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013). 
73 See Ginger Thompson, Extremist Report Draws Criticism; Prompts Apology, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009, 3:03 
PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/extremist-report-draws-criticism-prompts-apology/?_r=0.  
74 See Hearing on FY2010 Budget for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland 
Security Before the H. Homeland Security Subcomm. Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Bart Johnson, Acting Under Secretary) (“To strengthen our existing 
processes, an interim clearance process was put in place shortly after the release of the April 7, 2009 assessment. 
That process established mandatory review and concurrence by four offices - Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the 
Privacy Office, Office of the General Counsel, and I&A’s Intelligence Oversight Section. Any non-concurrence that 
could not be resolved was elevated to the Deputy Secretary for review, ensuring a much more coordinated review of 
I&A’s products than had previously been in place.”).   
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have been subject to CRCL’s clearance authority.  Perhaps that’s because I&A leadership lacked 
interest in such a product.  Or perhaps it’s because clearance would have been implausible.  As 
one of the email chains between two CRCL employees notes:  
 
W/r/t a larger report on the Occupy movement, do you mean that you don’t think CRCL 
could clear on any product on OWS [Occupy Wall Street], generally? I tend to agree that 
it would be difficult to clear on that, given that any concerns out of the movement thus far 
are local matters: reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on protests, health and 
safety issues, etc, all seem to be situational awareness issues (not domestic terrorism-
related) that apply only to locals dealing with particular protests, and therefore, lack a 
DHS nexus for reporting.  Given that their only foray into illegal activity, as a movement, 
seems to be violating permit rules and clashes with the police over removals (mostly, but 
not exclusively, through civil disobedience tactics), a product would tend to appear as 
merely reporting on First Amendment activity.  
 
All in all, the emails and documents paint a portrait of a large agency with many people 
thinking hard—and, I think, appropriately—about the First Amendment issues.  There are no 
smoking guns of repressive action or inappropriate monitoring.75  CRCL seems, from this 
evidence, to have played an important out-of-view part, mostly in educating agency personnel 
about the suggested non-interventionist approach, with that education reinforced by the 
somewhat authoritative role in intelligence product review the office had accreted after a prior 
public contretemps.   
B. Laptop Searches  
 
In February 2008, a Washington Post story profiled a number of American citizens who 
claimed their cell-phones and laptops had been searched, copied, and even confiscated by U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) when they were questioned at the border on their return to 
the United States from travel abroad.76  The article’s news hook was a Freedom of Information 
Act lawsuit filed the same day by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Asian Law Caucus, 
seeking CBP policy documents relating to such border searches.77  While the issue had already 
75 Truthout acknowledges this with some regret, noting:  “[T]he public still does not have a complete picture of 
what role, if any, the federal government played in dismantling the nationwide encampments. . . . Unfortunately, 
about 250 pages of redacted documents released last week by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), in response to Truthout’s 17-month-old Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request, does not contain any smoking guns that would put to rest that lingering question.”  
Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at Occupy Wall Street and 
Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/15389-newly-released-dhs-
emails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-in-violence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york.  
76 Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches Travelers’ Devices Seized at Border, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 7, 2008. 
77 After the case was filed, CBP provided most of the documents sought; the plaintiffs continued their challenge 
seeking additional information, but lost.  Asian Law Caucus v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 4:08-cv-
00842, 2008 WL 5047839 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (granting the government summary judgment).   
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made an appearance in several federal court opinions in criminal cases,78 the Post story made a 
real splash; laptop searches became newly salient for both civil rights groups and Congress.  The 
matter was pressed, for example, at a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing titled “Laptop 
Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from Overseas 
Travel.”79 Bills were introduced,80 reports written,81 FOIA requests submitted,82 objections 
elaborated,83 and affirmative lawsuits filed.84  
 
In the middle of the controversy, DHS released materials on the extant policy and the 
prevalence of electronic device border searches. The released information showed that CBP 
policy allowed border officials to search (and copy) the contents of laptops and cell-phones of 
any traveler—U.S. citizen or foreign national—undergoing border inspection, with or without 
suspicion.  CBP also released information on the prevalence of laptop and cell-phone searches: 
such searches occurred at a rate of 250 per month in the months of 2008-2009 covered by the 
disclosure85: miniscule as a percentage of travelers but still large as a number.  Advocates and 
Congress were not satisfied by this information and kept the issue alive into the new 
administration, asking the new Secretary to review and revise the policy.  On August 27, 2009, 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 
501, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Arnold, 
454 F.Supp.2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). 
79 Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from Overseas Travel: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Const. Subcomm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Jayson P. Ahern, 
Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).  
80 See Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008, H.R. 6588, 110th Cong. (2008); Securing Our Borders and Our 
Data Act of 2008, H.R. 6702, 110th Cong. (2008); Securing our Borders and our Data Act of 2009, H.R. 239, 111th 
Cong.) (2009); Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. (2008); Border Security 
Search Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1726, 111th Cong. (2009); Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP Act 
of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th Cong. (2009); Travelers’ Device Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. 
(2008); Travelers’ Device Privacy Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 7118, 110th Cong. (2008). 
81 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT 
OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP (April 2009), available at http://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/sites/asian-law-
caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf/; MUSLIM ADVOCATES: UNREASONABLE INTRUSIONS: AMERICANS RETURNING 
HOME SEARCHED AND INTERROGATED ABOUT POLITICS, FAITH & FINANCES (April 2009), available at 
http://www.muslimadvocates.org/americans_returning_home_searched_interrogated_about_politics_faith_finances;  
YULE KIM, BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOP COMPUTERS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES 3 (Cong. 
Research Serv., RL34404, 2009).  Later advocacy reports included CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SUSPICIONLESS BORDER 
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES: LEGAL AND PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY’S POLICY (May 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Border_Search_of_Electronic_Devices_0518_2011.pdf;  
82 See Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU Staff Attorney, to Mark Hanson, FOIA Director, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/laptopfoia.pdf.   
83 See, e.g., ACLU Seeks Records About Laptop Searches at the Border, ACLU (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/aclu-seeks-records-about-laptop-searches-border. 
84 See Abidor v. Napolitano, 1:10-cv-04059 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 7, 2010); House v. Napolitano, 1:11-cv-10852 
(D. Mass. filed May 13, 2011), 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. 2012). 
85 See Laptop Search Analysis, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/laptop-search-analysis.  I used this table to compute the average: 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/laptopsearch/Tab_24_Chart_with_formulas_08182010.xls.    
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DHS announced new policies for both CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE).86  Unlike the old policies, which had only been made public after substantial dispute, the 
new policies were immediately posted on the Department’s website.  They were a bit more 
constraining than the versions they replaced.  In particular, they included timeframes, banned 
detention of devices after searches were complete, required device owners be provided 
information on appeal rights, and added supervisory review.  They did not, however, add a 
suspicion prerequisite for searches.  In addition, the Secretary instructed CRCL to conduct a 
“Civil Liberties Impact Assessment” within 120 days, a deadline of December 2009.   
 
Program Review.  A “Civil Liberties Impact Assessment” is a report.  The phrase calls to 
mind the Environmental Impact Assessments required by the National Environment Policy Act 
of 1969,87 and the Privacy Impact Assessments required by the E-Government Act,88 but 
whereas EIAs and PIAs have become institutionalized, analogues in other arenas have not.89  As 
of August 2009, CRCL had completed just four earlier Civil Liberties Impact Assessments.90  
The concept of an impact assessment is to systematically examine both the risks posed by a 
planned or ongoing process, and costs and benefits of potential strategies for amelioration of 
those risks.91  This new electronic device searching impact assessment, the first started in the 
new administration, was not quickly forthcoming.  In fact, it was not completed until December 
2011, twenty months later than the Secretary had directed.  And it was not immediately made 
public; although its completion was noted in a quarterly report to Congress,92 even a bare 
86 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION, CBP 
Directive No. 3340-049 (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf; DEPT. OF 
HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES, ICE Directive No. 7-6.1 (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf.   
87 National Environment Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190 § 102(2)(C), 83 Stat. 852, 853 (1970), codified as 
amended as 42 U.S.C. § 432(c).   
88 See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, M-03-22, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE E-
GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 (2003) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22 (“Privacy 
Impact Assessment (PIA) is an analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling conforms to applicable 
legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of collecting, 
maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system, and (iii) to 
examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy 
risks.”). 
89 The idea of a civil liberties impact assessment seems to have made its first appearance in CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, SECURING AMERICA, PROTECTING OUR FREEDOMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 14-15 (2005) available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=474133.  See also Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 
+ 7/7 = ? What Counts in Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 609-24 (2006).  As Marks points 
out, a proposal for a Human Rights Impact Assessment process in public health policy formulation was made over a 
decade earlier.  Lawrence Gostin & Jonathan Mann, Toward the Development of a Human Rights Impact 
Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health Policies, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 58 (1994), 
available at http:// www.hsph.harvard.edu/fxbcenter/V1N1gostin.htm.  
90 See Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, DEPT. HOMELAND SEC. http://www.dhs.gov/civil-
rights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013). 
91 Gostin, supra note 89, at 61. 
92 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES Q. REP. FY2012, Q3 (Oct. 3, 
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-quarterly-report-fy-2012-q3_0.pdf.  The 
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executive summary was not posted until over a year later, in January 2013.93  The to-be-expected 
FOIA request quickly followed,94 and in June 2013 DHS released a full version, albeit with legal 
analysis redacted.95  
 
The Impact Assessment—by this time titled a “Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Impact 
Assessment”—took the position that suspicionless laptop searches by border agents did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  In this it lined up with all the Court of Appeals precedent extant 
at the time the document was completed.96  (Between completion and release, the Ninth Circuit 
held, en banc, that forensic laptop searches, but not non-forensic searches, had to be justified by 
reasonable suspicion.97  More on that decision below.)  Even though CRCL found no 
constitutional violations, the Impact Assessment nonetheless made five recommendations: 
 
• Record a reason for each search.  “CBP officers who decide to conduct a device search 
generally should record the reason for the search in a TECS [computer system] field. To 
be clear, we are not recommending that officers demonstrate reasonable suspicion for the 
device search; rather we recommend that officers simply record the actual reason they are 
conducting the search, whatever that reason is. This recommendation exceeds 
constitutional requirements, but should facilitate CBP’s operational supervision and 
oversight.”  
• Explicitly ban race, religion, and ethnicity discrimination in searches, subject to 
narrowly tailored exceptions.  CRCL recommended that CBP and ICE should 
supplement the Department’s overarching antidiscrimination policy by “stat[ing] 
explicitly in policy that it is generally impermissible for officers to discriminate against 
travelers—including by singling them out for specially rigorous searching—because of 
their actual or perceived race, religion, or ethnicity, and that officers may use race, 
religion, or ethnicity as a factor in conducting discretionary device searches only when 
(a) the search is based on information (such as a suspect description) specific to an 
incident, suspect, or ongoing criminal activity, or (b) limited to situations in which 
Component leadership has found such consideration temporarily necessary based on their 
assessment of intelligence information and risk, because alternatives do not meet security 
needs.” 
• Collect data and conduct analysis of racial/ethnic disparate impact.  “CBP should 
improve monitoring of the distribution of electronic device searching by race and 
report states that the Impact Assessment was completed in August 2012, id. at 8, but the report, when released, was 
dated December 2011. 
93 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, BORDER SEARCHES OF 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-border-search-impact-
assessment_01-29-13_1.pdf.  
94 See FOIA Request Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU, to Fernando Pineiro, DHS FOIA Officer (Feb. 8, 
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dhs_border_search_report_foia.pdf.  
95 See DHS FOIA Response (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-border-search-
impact-assessment_06-03-13_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013). 
96 See sources cited supra note 78. 
97 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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ethnicity, by conducting routine analysis to “assess whether travelers of any particular 
ethnicity . . . at any port of entry are being chosen for electronic device searches in 
substantial disproportion to that ethnicity’s portion of all travelers through the port. . . .  
Data and results should be shared with CRCL.”  
• Remedy any detected disparate impact.  If analysis suggests “that electronic device 
searching in any port has a substantial unexplained skew towards travelers of one or more 
ethnicity, CBP should work with CRCL on developing appropriate oversight 
mechanisms. Subsequent steps generally should include a requirement of supervisory 
approval for searches (absent exigent circumstances) or enhanced training, and may 
include other responses.”  
• Improve notice of redress avenues.  “CBP should improve the notice given to travelers 
subjected to electronic device searches by updating tear sheets to refer travelers to DHS 
TRIP [Travelers Redress Inquiry Program] if they seek redress.” The assessment noted 
that TRIP’s intake categories were correspondingly expanded, to allow complainants to 
reference not just discrimination but also abusive or coercive screening and free 
speech/free press violations.   
 
CBP, the posted summary noted, had agreed to carry out each recommendation.    
 
 Civil liberties advocates were far from happy with the Impact Assessment.  The ACLU, 
for example, described it as “disappointing” and its logic as “faulty.”98  Arguing in favor of a 
reasonable suspicion standard for border searches in terms that were not limited to electronic 
devices,99 it summarized:  “Even at the border, the Fourth Amendment requires more than just 
hunches.  It is disappointing that the DHS watchdog dedicated to protecting our privacy and 
other civil liberties does not recognize that.”  The blogosphere ridiculed the project of an 
internally-conducted impact assessment as illegitimate (“What else would you expect them to 
say?”100), and commenters questioned the bona fides of CRCL, describing it as an “Orwellian”101 
office that “probably functions more like an entity tasked with creating and promoting the legal 
justification for programs that violate laws or civil liberties.”102  
98 Brian Hauss, DHS Releases Disappointing Civil Liberties Report on Border Searches of Laptops and Other 
Electronics, ACLU (June 5, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-immigrants-rights-national-
security/dhs-releases-disappointing-civil.  
99 The ACLU’s blog post on the topic noted, for example, “To be sure, rummaging around through people’s 
personal papers may well turn up the occasional bad guy, but that is not the only consideration.”  Id.  Of course, the 
government’s authority to “rummage[e] around through people’s personal papers” without any suspicion at all, if 
that rummaging is during a border inspection, is established.  See, e.g., United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1003-
04 (9th Cir. 2008) (summarizing cases upholding suspicionless searches of personal papers and effects during border 
inspections).  
100 Mike Masnick, Homeland Security: Not Searching Your Laptop Doesn’t Benefit Your Civil Liberties, So We 




102 Kevin Gosztola, DHS Finds Suspicionless Border Searches Do Not Violate Americans’ Civil Liberties, THE 
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Lending credibility to the critics’ complaints was the Cotterman decision by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, en banc.  In a decision rendered during the writing of the 
impact assessment, a 9th Circuit panel had agreed with the United States in a child pornography 
prosecution that no individualized suspicion was necessary to justify a border inspection laptop 
search.103  A few months after completion of the assessment, however, though long before its 
release, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc,104 and in March 2013, reversed on this 
point.105  Forensic searches, the en banc court held, were far more intrusive than non-forensic 
examinations of electronic devices or of, say, luggage:  “It is as if a search of a person’s suitcase 
could reveal not only what the bag contained on the current trip, but everything it had ever 
carried.”106  Accordingly, such searches were lawful under the Fourth Amendment only if 
supported by individualized “reasonable suspicion.”  
   
CRCL released the very short executive summary without fanfare—indeed, without any 
notice or background at all.  The same is true for the FOIA-prompted release of the entire report, 
months later.  Any announcement would no doubt have emphasized the five recommendations in 
the impact assessment, and that each had been adopted by DHS.  In any event, there was 
essentially no public discussion of those recommendations; coverage of the release in blogs and 
the press was entirely dominated by the civil rights and civil liberties community’s displeasure 
with the reasonable suspicion conclusion.  This is true even though those recommendations gave 
the advocacy groups a great deal that they had previously sought, which might have been 
advantageously celebrated and even built upon in additional areas.  The rule that CBP officers 
“record the reason” for any electronic device search went some distance, though not all the way, 
to a requirement that there be reasonable suspicion—yet this aspect of the report got no attention.  
The recommendation that the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program complaint form—
thousands of which are filed each year—led to modification of the options travelers can check to 
include complaints about allegedly abusive searches and interviews, allowing previously 
impossible monitoring of those issues.107  Even more striking, the CRCL-recommended 
articulation of a clear departmental rule against racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in 
searching was something that civil rights and civil liberties groups had sought for years.108  And 
they had similarly long proposed data collection and analysis to monitor the possibility of bias in 
103 United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). 
104 United States v. Cotterman, 673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir., Mar. 19, 2012) (granting reh’g en banc). 
105 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  The en banc court held, however, that 
the facts available to the searching border agents were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, and therefore 
upheld the search. 
106 Id. at 959. 
107 See DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FY 2011 ANN. REP. 26 (2012) 
(reporting that 10% of DHS TRIP complaints used those new checkoff boxes).  
108 See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL 
RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP 29 (April 2009), available at http://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/sites/asian-
law-caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf (“DHS ought to adopt a rule prohibiting law enforcement decisions based 
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traveler screening.109  All this was in the impact assessment’s accepted recommendations, but 
either nobody noticed, or advocates decided that they gained more from decrying the reasonable 
suspicion conclusion and did not want to muddy their message by praising these other policy 
changes.  
C. Border Patrol and Interpretation  
 
On May 14, 2011, Benjamin Roldan Salinas and his girlfriend, M.N., were harvesting 
salal in the Olympic National Forest.  (Salal is an attractive groundcover plant; people get 
permits to pick it in forest service lands, and then resell it to florists.110)  A Forest Service officer 
saw the couple from his car and immediately called the Border Patrol; based on his experience 
with salal harvesters and their limited English, he asked Border Patrol for assistance with 
Spanish-language interpretation.  He then stopped the car in which the two were driving and 
began to ask them questions (in English).  When the Border Patrol car pulled up, both fled on 
foot.  Salinas jumped into the Sol Duc River and was swept away.111  Ms. N. was arrested and 
charged with an immigration violation; news reports say that she was released after 10 days.112  
Salinas was found three weeks later, dead, his body tangled in brush four miles down river.113   
 
The tragedy of a death increased considerably the focus by advocacy organizations on the 
topic—but the issue was far from new.  Advocacy groups had for some time been concerned 
about Border Patrol enforcement at the northern border, arguing that it was unduly aggressive 
and often discriminatory.  They pointed to the fact that the number of northern Border Patrol 
agents has skyrocketed, under congressional pressure, since 9/11114; notwithstanding the small 
number of attempted illegal border crossings to engage those so assigned, the number of northern 
border agents in 2012 was over 2000, compared to about 300 a decade before.115  These agents 
109 See, e.g., id. (“To allow Congress and the public to monitor compliance with this rule, DHS should require 
CBP officers to log the gender, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and nationality, as known or perceived, of 
each individual subjected to secondary inspections, searches of electronic devices, or other special security measures 
at each port of entry, and to report this information on an annual basis.”).  Cf. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, RACIAL 
PROFILING AND THE NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION: WHAT DHS SHOULD COLLECT AND MONITOR (Nov. 2011), 
available at 
http://rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Collection%20Recommendations%20for%20DHS.PDF 
(urging racial data collection in the different context of immigration enforcement, as well.  
110 See Salal Permit Sales to Begin at Olympic National Forest, USDA FOREST SERVICE (Aug. 25, 2011),  
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/olympic/news-events/?cid=STELPRDB5327177.  
111 The facts in this paragraph are taken from [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, FS-11-5171, 
28 (Apr. 28, 2012), available at 
http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/DecisionOfOASCRUSDAreCivilRightsComplaintREDACTEDforReleas
e.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
112 See Lornet Turnbull & Roberto Daza, Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants, SEATTLE TIMES, June 
26, 2011, at 1;  William Yardley, In Far Northwest, A New Border Focus on Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, at 
A1. 
113 Turnbull, supra note 112.  
114 See CHAD HADDAL, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32562, BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. BORDER 
PATROL, 22 (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf.  
115 Just six weeks after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized a tripling of Border Patrol personnel assigned to 
the northern border, from its 2001 allotment of 340.  By 2005, the number assigned had reached over 1000.  Then in 
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spend a good deal of their time collaborating with local law enforcement, and advocacy 
organizations reported that much of this collaboration was initiated as calls by local law 
enforcement for language assistance.  (All Border Patrol agents are required to speak functional 
Spanish.116)  Once Border Patrol was on the scene, enforcement interviews and often 
immigration arrests frequently followed.   
 
Advocacy and community organizations complained that the practice violated the civil 
rights of their clients and participants.  For agencies that receive federal financial assistance—
which is to say, nearly every law enforcement agency117—the argument was founded on Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Among other things, Title VI forbids national origin 
discrimination by federally supported organizations; in the 1974 case of Lau v. Nichols, the 
Supreme Court held that this ban covers language discrimination as well.  (Indeed, the Court said 
in Lau, the challenged implementing regulation’s requirement that recipients take “affirmative 
steps to rectify . . . language deficiency” was permissible under Title VI.  Across the 
government, Title VI regulations have similar provisions.)  So the argument is a simple one: the 
use of Border Patrol agents as interpreters by federally supported police departments is 
inappropriate, because it subjects Spanish-speakers to law enforcement inquiry and potential 
immigration consequences not faced by others, constituting language discrimination and a failure 
to provide appropriate language access.   
 
Outreach and its uses.  Just days after Mr. Salinas’s body was found, a leading advocacy 
organization highlighted the issue in an email to CRCL staff, setting out allegations related to 
two different incidents—Mr. Salinas was referred to only obliquely.  The complaints led to a 
meeting between CRCL and Border Patrol in June 2011, “on the topic of provision of 
interpretive services and how to avoid having it chill immigrant calls to police, etc.”  
Documented in the response to a FOIA request, the email and an accompanying memo 
summarizing the meeting’s resolution state that CBP and CRCL agreed to explore CBP use of 
“musters [in-service training statements] or other relatively low-key guidance.”  CBP was to 
coordinate with CRCL on “a draft guidance or muster on the topic of avoiding harm to 
community policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with language 
interpretation.”118  The pressure from advocates and community groups was noted:  “This is 
2006, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required that 20% of the Border Patrol’s annual 
increases in manpower be assigned to the northern border.  P.L. 108-458.  In FY 2010 and subsequent years, the 
number of Border Patrol agents was over 2,200.  See UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL AGENT 
STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (OCT. 1ST THROUGH SEPT. 30TH), 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/staffing_1993_
2012.ctt/staffing_1993_2012.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
116See FAQs – Working for Border Patrol, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/careers/customs_careers/border_careers/bp_agent/faqs_working_for_the_usbp.xml#Jo
bRequirements (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
117 For an index to all the recipients of federal financial assistance from the Department of Justice alone, see OJP 
Grant Awards, DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/selector/main (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2013). 
118 See Memorandum from [redacted], Immigration Section Policy Advisor, for Meeting Participants (July 29, 
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becoming a hotter topic by the day, and we really need to figure out an appropriately robust 
response.119   
 
It is worth noting that under the Title VI theory, the civil rights violator is not the Border 
Patrol but rather the agency that calls Border Patrol.  It is the agency that places that phone call 
that is allegedly breaching its language access obligations, discriminating against Spanish 
speakers; Border Patrol may be facilitating this breach, but it is not itself discriminating.  The 
result is that CRCL’s jurisdiction over the Border Patrol interpretation issue was far from 
exclusive.  The Department of Justice provides financial support for a high percentage of the 
nation’s law enforcement agencies, and therefore has Title VI authority.  And the Department of 
Justice’s civil rights offices (both the Office of Justice Programs’ Office of Civil Rights, and the 
Civil Rights Division’s Federal Coordination and Compliance Section) face a very different 
environment than does CRCL with respect to CBP operational activities.  The political and 
relational realities that make it difficult for an internal agency office to find another agency 
office’s conduct problematic are bound to be lessened in a situation in which the complained-
about conduct is mostly conducted by another agency.  I analyze in Part II the ways in which the 
potential involvement of a sister agency value-based ally, such as the Department of Justice, 
affects the hand of an office such as CRCL.  Here, I will simply note that the FOIA’d documents 
demonstrate that the potential for Justice Department involvement was clearly in the minds of the 
actors.120   
 
Complaint investigation.  Immigrant rights advocates took advantage of the overlapping 
jurisdictional issue just a few days later; in July 2011, Ms. N (Mr. Salinas’s girlfriend) filed a 
complaint, not with DHS, but with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which the 
Forest Service is a component.  Because Mr. Salinas’s death was after an encounter with a 
federal—“federally conducted,” in the language of federal civil rights offices, not “federally 
supported”—law enforcement agency, Title VI does not apply.  But, represented by the 
Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Ms. N.’s complaint argued that the Forest Service officer’s 
actions constituted race and national origin discrimination, in violation of USDA’s 
antidiscrimination regulation121 and Executive Order 13166, which has since 2000 forbidden 
federal agencies to discriminate against people with limited English proficiency.  NWIRP’s 
argument was twofold.  First, just as under Title VI, NWIRP argued that use of Border Patrol as 
interpreters was inappropriate, because it subjected Spanish-speakers to law enforcement inquiry 
and potential immigration consequences not faced by others stopped by Forest Service officers.  
119 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger, then DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, to Ronald D. 
Vitiello, Deputy Chief, Border Patrol (July 28, 2011, 7:57 AM), in 8/22/2012 DHS OCRCL FOIA RESPONSE, supra 
note 118, at 86-87.  
120 See Memorandum from [redacted], Immigration Section Policy Advisor, for Meeting Participants (July 29, 
2011), supra note 118, at 91 (“She and Officer Schlanger also discussed the role of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
in enforcing these laws, and the recently-circulated draft DOJ Frequently Asked Questions . . .”). 
121 7 C.F.R. § 15(d) (“No agency, officer, or employee of the United States Department of Agriculture shall, on 
the ground of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, familial status, sexual orientation, or 
disability, or because all of part of an individual’s income is derived from any public assistance program, exclude 
from participation in, deny the benefits of, or subject to discrimination any person in the United States under any 
program or activity conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture.”). 
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Second, NWIRP claimed, that use was pretextual, a cover for hostility towards Hispanics or 
perhaps for the arresting Forest Service Officer’s interest in immigration enforcement, which 
should not have been his concern.  The complaint included strong evidence on both theories, 
including an email sent on June 8, 2011, by the Forest Service Officer who was the subject of the 
complaint to several individuals complaining that in the aftermath of the incident, a community 
member was watching his house.  A Border Patrol Officer on the email chain responded, “The 
great thing would be to request translation assistance so that we are able to sack this guy up.”  As 
the USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights later noted, “The implication of this 
email was that the practice of requesting interpretation assistance is a guise for initiating an 
immigration enforcement action. . . . The tone of this email clearly implied that this was a standing 
practice between FSO [the Forest Service Officer] and BP [Border Patrol].”122  
 
Complaining to USDA was a savvy piece of advocacy by NWIRP.  USDA’s civil rights 
office is not just an Office of Goodness—it is uniquely empowered, among federal civil rights 
offices.  Its operative regulation was promulgated by the Clinton Administration in 1999123 just 
after the Department settled a mammoth fair-lending case to remedy generations of 
discrimination against African-American farmers.124  That regulation granted the USDA Office 
of the Assistant Secretary not just the authority to adjudicate complaints, but also to make “final 
determinations . . . as to the corrective actions required to resolve program complain[ts].”125  So 
unlike CRCL, which is authorized only to make recommendations to the Secretary and DHS 
offices, and required then to report to Congress those recommendations and the agency 
response,126 USDA’s civil rights office, led by a Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary for Civil 
Rights, has the regulatory authority to direct other USDA offices what to do.127  That authority 
122 [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, FS-11-5171, 28 (Apr. 28, 2012), available at 
http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/DecisionOfOASCRUSDAreCivilRightsComplaintREDACTEDforReleas
e.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
123 See Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 64 Fed. Ref. 66,709 (Nov. 30, 1999) 
(amending 7 C.F.R. § 15d (1999)); Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 
62,962 (Nov. 10, 1998) (amending 7 C.F.R. § 15d (1998)); Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and 
Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,851 (Apr. 23, 1996) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 15d (1996)). 
124 See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).  See also TADLOCK COWAN & JODY FEDER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK 
FARMERS (2012), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS20430.pdf. 
125 The regulation has what looks like two corresponding scriveners errors.  It reads:  “The Director of the Office 
of Civil Rights will make final determinations as to the merits of complaints under this part and as to the corrective 
actions required to resolve program complainants. The complaint will be notified of the final determination on his 
or her complaint.”  7 C.F.R. § 15d.4(b) (emphasis added).  It seems clear the two emphasized words should have 
been switched.  See also 7 C.F.R. 288(a)(13) (authorizing the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights to “make final 
determinations on both the merits and required corrective action” for program complaints). 
126 See 6 U.S.C. § 345; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1.  
127 I do not mean to take a position on the essentially hypothetical issue whether the Secretary would be 
empowered to instruct the Assistant Secretary how to use this regulatory authority.  This is the analogue of the 
longstanding administrative law argument about the extent of presidential authority over decisions by executive 
branch officials. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250-51 & nn. 8 & 9 
(2001) (citing scholarship on both sides of the question, and taking a position “accept[ing] Congress’s broad power 
to insulate administrative activity from the President, but argu[ing] that Congress has left more power in presidential 
hands than generally is recognized”).  
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seems not to be very often asserted (and was not utilized at all in the Bush administration), but it 
continues to exist.128   
 
Over the next months, as the USDA investigation moved along, the advocacy community 
worked to bolster its point of view by preparing two in-depth reports, each combining 
sympathetic facts, a rights-based frame, and policy argumentation.129  The issue remained a live 
one at DHS, but the guidance mentioned in the memo summarizing the June 2011 meeting did 
not issue.  Indeed, in April 2012, there is evidence that CRCL at least considered seeking formal 
legal advice from the DHS Office of the General Counsel on the issue.130  In May, nine months 
after filing its USDA complaint, NWIRP took another step to increase inter-agency pressure on 
DHS, filing another complaint, this time with the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Homeland Security, on behalf of five new complainants as well as (again) M.N.  Each of the 
complainants had been stopped by non-immigration law enforcement, who called Border Patrol 
to help with interpretation.  In each case, the Border Patrol agent who responded then questioned 
the complainant about his or her immigration status; several of them were put into immigration 
proceedings as a result.  The theory of this complaint was the same as for the Forest Service 
complaint, except with a Title VI jurisdictional hook: 
 
We therefore believe that the interpretation/translation assistance justification is being 
used to cover a pattern of discriminatory enforcement activity that the agents themselves 
appear to realize is problematic. Hence, they report that their involvement was as a result 
of a request for interpretation assistance.  The inescapable conclusion is that the actual or 
pretextual use of Border Patrol agents for interpretation assistance by law enforcement 
agencies is resulting in outright discrimination in one of two ways: 1) to the extent that it 
is really about language access, it constitutes impermissible discrimination because the 
price of such access for a segment of the LEP population is enduring questioning about 
citizenship and immigration status (and detention and deportation for some); or 2) to the 
extent that it is simply a pretext in cases where law enforcement agencies are calling in 
Border Patrol without justification, it is of course a different, but no less pernicious, form 
of discrimination. In either case, the practice violates civil rights protections.131 
128 See USDA, Civil Rights at USDA: A Backgrounder on Efforts by the Obama Administration, 
http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA%20Civil%20Rights%20Background.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).  See 
also Reports of Civil Rights Complaints, Resolutions, and Actions, USDA, http://www.ascr.usda.gov/reports.html 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
129 See SARAH CURRY ET AL., One America and the Univ. of Washington Center for Human Rights, THE 
GROWING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS ALONG WASHINGTON’S NORTHERN BORDER (Apr. 17, 2012), available at 
https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareoneamerica.org/files/REPORT_northernborder-FINAL.pdf; LISA 
GRAYBILL, Am. Immigration Council, BORDER PATROL AGENTS AS INTERPRETERS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER:  
UNWISE POLICY, ILLEGAL PRACTICE (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/2012,0927-
graybill.pdf. 
130 See Draft Memorandum from Tamara Kessler for Audrey Anderson, in 8/22/2012 DHS OCRCL FOIA 
RESPONSE, supra note 118, at 10. 
131 Letter from Jorge Barón, Executive Director, Northwestern Immigrant Rights Project, Elizabeth Hawkins, 
Attorney, Bean Porter Hawkins PLLC, and Wendy Hernandez, Attorney, Hernandez Immigration Law, to Eric 
Holder, Attorney General, and Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary 8 (May 1, 2012), available at 
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The May 1 complaint sought intervention by the Department of Justice, whose Civil 
Rights Division coordinates Title VI and Executive Order 13166 enforcement across the 
government, and whose Office of Justice Programs has the lead role in Title VI enforcement 
involving law enforcement agencies that have received funding from the Department of Justice.  
The complaint requested two DOJ statements: the first, to local law enforcement and the second 
to federal law enforcement, that use of Border Patrol agents as interpreters violates Title VI and 
Executive Order 13166 obligations, respectively.  In addition, NWIRP asked DHS to terminate 
removal proceedings for anyone facing immigration consequences as a result of a request for 
interpretation by Border Patrol agents.   
 
The USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights issued a formal finding 
against the U.S. Forest Service on May 31, 2012, declaring, after comprehensive analysis, that 
Forest Service use of Border Patrol agents to provide interpretation services constituted national 
origin discrimination and also that the language access issue was being used was a pretext for 
discrimination against Latinos.  Over the evident opposition of the Forest Service, the Final 
Agency Decision closed with an “Order of Relief,” which included an instruction to the Forest 
Service to develop a language access plan that relied on neutral interpreters, not Border Patrol 
agents.132  This order went much further than the hypothetical Border Patrol guidance discussed 
within DHS nearly a year before; that was described in the FOIA’d email as guidance about 
“avoiding harm to community policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with 
language interpretation” whereas the USDA order simply banned, altogether, language assistance 
coordination with Border Patrol. 
 
 This episode highlights, in particular, the cross-agency dynamics involved in the work of 
an Office of Goodness.  The USDA’s finding of discrimination was an important victory for the 
advocacy groups, ratifying their legal approach to the Border Patrol interpretation issue.  But 
they still did not have what they really wanted, because the USDA decision covered only the 
Forest Service.  To cover state and local law enforcement calls to Border Patrol would require 
either an authoritative ruling by the Department of Justice (governing the obligations of these 
federally supported agencies) or a policy change by the Border Patrol.  It took another six 
months, but on November 21, 2012, CBP promulgated “Guidance on Providing Language 
Assistance to Other Law Enforcement Organizations,” which instructed Border Patrol offices not 
to agree to requests from non-DHS law enforcement agencies seeking “CBP assistance based 
solely on a need for language translation.”  Instead, “absent any other circumstances, those 
http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/ComplaintToUSDOJandDHSreInterpretationAssistanceFinalRedacted05-
01-2012.pdf.  See also id. at 2:  
“As the Border Patrol agents are preparing to depart, the WSP trooper thanks them and has the following 
exchange with the agents: 
• WSP Trooper: ‘Well, I appreciate you coming out.’ 
• BP Agent: ‘No problem, give us a call anytime.’ 
• WSP Trooper: ‘Oh yeah, well, we like to, we just have to do it in a roundabout sort of way.’ 
• BP Agent: ‘That’s fine, that’s great, we have no problem with that. We appreciate the calls.’”  
132 [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, supra note 122, at 35. 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
29
Schlanger:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
requests should be referred” to interpreters.133  The policy was distributed to relevant groups—
including NWIRP—about two weeks later.134 
 
 Training.  Finally, once the policy was announced, CRCL did outreach to affected local 
law enforcement agencies, offering them materials135 and training about alternatives to their 
prior reliance on Border Patrol for language assistance.136  I surmise that these activities assisted 
Border Patrol in its need to preserve good relations with local law enforcement, in part by 
improving local capacity but in part by suggesting that the denial of language assistance was 
attributable not to Border Patrol’s own preferences but because of civil rights imperatives.  
D. The NCTC AG Guidelines 
 
On March 22, 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence announced a 
major change to federal information sharing policy.  New guidelines replaced rules announced in 
2008, and now permit the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to obtain and retain large 
federal governmental datasets that contain mostly non-terrorism information about U.S. citizens 
for up to five years, in order to facilitate repeated “pattern-based” computer queries and analysis 
designed to identify terrorism information.  It is up to each federal agency from which NCTC 
requests databases to negotiate terms—including whether a shorter time frame is appropriate. 
Previously NCTC was allowed to hold onto these kinds of datasets only for 180 days—enough 
time to process the data, but not to simply put it into storage on the chance that it might later 
prove useful.  In addition, the prior permitted uses of pattern analysis were narrower.137 
 
This all sounds technical but is actually not.  As far as public information indicated, the 
new guidelines constituted a sea change in federal governmental surveillance of U.S. residents 
and citizens.  Just about everything any part of the federal government knows about anyone is 
now potentially available for five years of big-data-mining by federal counterterrorism 
authorities.  (We know now that similar data-ingestion and data-mining techniques were being 
used by other agencies, too,138 but that information became public much later, and is beyond this 
133 Memorandum from David V. Aguilar, CBP Deputy Commissioner for CBP Officers (Nov. 21, 2012) 
(available at http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=1233 (last visited Aug. 17, 2013)). 
134 Press Release, Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, Breaking News: Border Patrol Policy Change Important 
Victory for Border Communities (Dec. 13, 2013) (available at http://www.nwirp.org/news/viewmediarelease/49 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013)). 
135 See LEP Resource Guide for Law Enforcement, DHS OCRCL, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/lep-resouce-guide-law-enforcement_0.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 
2013). 
136 See CRCL Provides Language Access Technical Assistance to Law Enforcement, DHS (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.dhs.gov/crcl-provides-language-access-technical-assistance-law-enforcement. 
137 For a defense of the new rules in civil liberties terms, see OFFICE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL LIBERTIES 
AND PRIVACY OFFICE, INFORMATION PAPER: DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
INCORPORATED IN THE UPDATED NCTC GUIDELINES (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://nctc.gov/docs/CLPO_Information_Paper_on_NCTC_AG_Guidelines_-_1-22-13.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 
2013). 
138 See Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone 
Metadata, WASH. POST, June 15, 2013, at A1; Ellen Nakashima et al., New Documents Reveal Parameters of NSA’s 
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Article’s purview.)  Yet although privacy advocates and bloggers tried to fan the flames, public 
response to the NCTC AG guidelines change was short lived.  The New York Times ran a front 
page story, devoting some space to the “civil-liberties concerns among privacy advocates.”  But 
those concerns somehow didn’t catch on.  Blog posts like “The National Counterterrorism Center 
Just Declared All of Us Domestic Terrorists”139 got little traction.  Civil liberties have a limited 
constituency,140 and with so little to gain, politically, perhaps Democrats in Congress were 
reluctant to make this an issue on which they would fight the Administration.141  (Subsequent 
NSA revelations seem to be changing this political calculus.)   
 
Working groups.  Nine months after the NCTC guidelines were issued, a story in the Wall 
Street Journal by investigative reporter Julia Angwin revealed a much more sustained record of 
dissent within the government.  Based on both reporting and FOIA’d documents, which she 
posted, Angwin’s story revealed that CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office had opposed the 
eventually adopted changes over the course of a full year.  The documents include staff emails 
starting February 2011 discussing recommended language, talking points, and briefing memos.  
The discussions and work was conducted via a working group, denominated the “Internal 
Records Working Group,”142 or occasionally “DHS/NCTC Records Working Group.”143 It 
evidently including staff from numerous DHS offices—the Office of Intelligence & Analysis, 
Privacy, CRCL, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Policy, and relevant operational 
components.144  It seems that the working group was able to develop one shared DHS set of 
suggestions about the NCTC guidelines.145  But these met with substantial resistance outside the 
Secret Surveillance Programs, WASH. POST, June 20, 2013, at A1; Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Said to Search Content of 
Messages to and From U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013, at A1; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British 
Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, 
at A1; Charlie Savage, Senate Panel Presses N.S.A. on Phone Logs, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, at A1; In re 
Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, Docket 105B(g) 07-01 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/105b-
g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).  
139 Marcy Wheeler, The National Counterterrorism Center Just Declared All of Us Domestic Terrorists, 
EMPTYWHEEL (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/03/23/the-national-counterterrorism-center-just-
declared-all-of-us-domestic-terrorists/. 
140 See, e.g., AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
72-82 (2011) (discussing the low level of “voter attention to the bureaucratic details of intelligence agencies”, and 
finding that “intelligence has fewer and weaker interest groups than almost any other policy area”).   
141 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 
(2006). 
142 See, e.g., Email from an Intelligence Operations Specialist at the Office of Intelligence & Analysis to Rebecca 
Richards and Others (Feb. 29, 2012), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE 43, 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/526365-dhs-interim-responsecontent.html#document/p347/a83505 (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
143 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (May 12, 2011, 12:52 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, 
at 148. 
144 See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 
142, at 55. 
145 Id.  See also E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:08 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, 
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Department; one email to a senior DHS lawyer from counsel’s office at the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI) states: “We certainly value the input. However, from our 
review, several of the comments tend to suggest a potential lack of understanding as to the 
overarching intent of the Guidelines. Furthermore, some of the edits you have proposed would 
eviscerate the authorities of the DNI and NCTC.”146  Staff discussions were then held between 
staff from DHS, ODNI, and the Department of Justice,147 but the results are not disclosed in the 
released materials. 
 
Advice.  By late spring 2011, the issues were being discussed, repeatedly, at the agency 
leadership level rather than only by staff.  A (redacted) May 12, 2011 memo to the Secretary 
from me, as CRCL’s head, and from DHS Chief Privacy Officer Mary Ellen Callahan, is titled 
(clunkily) “How Best to Express the Department’s Privacy and Civil Liberties-Related Concerns 
over Draft Guidelines Proposed by the Office of The Director of National Intelligence and the 
National Counterterrorism Center.”148  Disagreement continued in subsequent weeks and 
months.  For example, emails between a member of the Secretary’s staff and Callahan note that 
Callahan “non concurred on operational examples” evidently included in some document, 
because “they were complete non sequiturs, non-responsive, and did not demonstrate the 
underlying issues.”149  The Secretary’s involvement in the discussion is confirmed at several 
other points, as well.150   
 
By this time, the dispute was solidly multi-agency (or, as they say in the federal 
intelligence world, “in the interagency”).  And although there is no public documentation 
confirming the point, Angwin reported that Nancy Libin, the political appointee head of the 
Justice Department Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties—the DOJ’s analogous Office of 
Goodness—was likewise counseling against expansion of NCTC big-data authority.151  Angwin 
explained that that the proposed change was prompted by the Northwest Flight 253 “underwear 
bomber,” Umar Abdul Mutallab, who tried but failed to bring down a Detroit-bound airplane on 
Christmas day 2009.  She summarized that at both DOJ and at DHS, privacy and civil liberties 
officials “argued that the failure to catch Mr. Abdulmutallab wasn’t caused by the lack of a 
suspect—he had already been flagged—but by a failure to investigate him fully. So amassing 
146 See, e.g., E-mail from Matthew Kronisch to Mary Ellen Callahan & Margo Schlanger (Mar. 11, 2011, 2:44 
PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 47. 
147 Id. 
148 Memo from Margo Schlanger, CRCL Officer, and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, for Secretary 
Janet Napolitano (May 12, 2011), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 347. 
149 E-mail from Mary Ellen Callahan to John Cohen (June 17, 2011, 9:52 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, 
supra note 142, at 252.  
150 See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (June 1, 2011, 2:22 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 
142, at 212 (referencing an “‘information sharing’ S1 meeting” (“S1” means Secretary)); E-mail from [redacted] to 
Ken Hunt (July 28, 2011, 9:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 283 (referencing “another S1 
meeting coming up”).  Additional information on the meeting can be found on pp. 255-265. 
151 See Julia Angwin, U.S. Terrorism Agency to Tap a Vast Database of Citizens, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012 
(“At the Department of Justice, Chief Privacy Officer Nancy Libin raised concerns about whether the guidelines 
could unfairly target innocent people”). 
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more data about innocent people wasn’t necessarily the right solution.”152  And the argument did 
not die: after months of negotiations between DHS and NCTC, in November 2011 the civil 
liberties/privacy issues were revived within DHS by the CRCL and the Privacy Office with a 
new memo deemed likely to set off a “firestorm.”153  The two offices prepared talking points for 
the DHS Deputy Secretary for a March 2012 Deputies Committee154 meeting at the White 
House.  The Wall Street Journal reports that Callahan was told to make her case at that 
meeting,155 but to no avail.  The new rules were signed a few days later.   
 
*   *   * 
The four vignettes above provide the foundation for some more general thinking about 
Offices of Goodness.  In Part II, I canvass the tools available to them and how each one works.   
III. Tools Available to Offices of Goodness. 
 
Tools available to Offices of Goodness range along several dimensions: from the less to 
more coercive; from the less to more systemic; from the preventive to responsive; and from the 
internal to external.  While I’m sure other tools could be added by participants or observers with 
other backgrounds, I here explore a starter list, informed by the four controversies just described.   
A. Preventive tools  
 
Offices of Goodness have a variety of processes they can use to try to prevent or 
ameliorate agency operations that conflict with Goodness.  Here I analyze four of those 
methods—inclusion in policy formulation working groups; clearance; advice; and training and 
technical assistance.  Each of these tools can be used in a reactive context as well, to attempt to 
reduce or respond to a demonstrated problem. 
 
(1) Inclusion in working groups.  Like any bureaucratic organizations, federal 
agencies bring people together to work on projects.  One important way that an Office of 
Goodness can represent Goodness is by participating in such a working group.156  There are both 
risks and benefits to this approach.  The risk is erosion of value commitment as the Office of 
Goodness staff is carried along by the imperatives of whatever the working group’s project is—a 
152 Id. 
153 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger to Mary Ellen Callahan (Nov. 9, 2011, 9:01 PM), in DHS INTERIM 
RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 447 (“I’m not sure I’m prepared [for] the firestorm we’re about to create’); E-mail 
from Mary Ellen Callahan to Margo Schlanger (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:22 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 
142, at 446 (“I don’t know that we are ever going to get consensus on this from the other signatories, but we have 
the dep sec instructions”). 
154 The Deputies Committee is the most senior sub-cabinet meeting in the Executive Branch, bringing together 
the Deputy Secretaries of the national security agencies.  See NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1 
(“NSPD-1”), ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM, Feb. 13, 2001, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
155 See Angwin, supra note 151. 
156 For in-depth analysis of working groups in another agency and another context, see, for example, Thomas O. 
McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 72-88 (1991). 
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risk that is particularly strong if a conflict between the project and Goodness cannot be 
reconciled with technocratic adjustment or minor tweaks but rather requires some degree of 
sacrifice of project efficacy.  The benefit is inclusion of Goodness in group discussions as the 
project develops, which can lead to various types of accommodations and changes.157  Even if 
the group discussions end in impasse, full inclusion of the Office of Goodness staff can (though 
it need not) mean that the conflict is highlighted and explained to bureaucratic higher-ups, 
enabling those more senior officials to either fight it out or resolve it some other way.  The 
NCTC AG Guidelines incident described above provides an example; the working group 
negotiations described in the disclosed documents leading to, first, principals-level discussion at 
DHS and, eventually a Deputies Committee resolution, albeit one rejecting the position of DHS’s 
CRCL and Privacy Office.   
 
(2) Clearance authority.  Bureaucracies produce documents, and a common control 
device is a requirement of “coordination” prior to finalization of those documents.158  But as 
Pressman and  Wildavsky observed in their classic study of government policy implementation, 
“Telling another person to co-ordinate . . . does not tell him what to do.  He does not know 
whether to coerce or bargain, to exert power or secure consent.”159  A clearance requirement is 
one specific environment for this issue; clearance requirements can be more or less coercive.  On 
the most coercive end, an Office of Goodness could have the ability simply to bar promulgation 
of a document.  Such authority is usually, however, a hallmark of chain-of-command 
superiority—not something that Offices of Goodness typically possess.  While the agency-head 
can, of course, decline to issue (or deny permission to issue) a document, one government office 
ordinarily cannot authoritatively stop the issuance of a document by its sibling office.  Still, it is 
possible to give an office assigned a clearance role something very close to that power, by 
structuring the conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that needs to 
“appeal” a clearance denial.  This is what is described in the account above about DHS and 
Occupy.  If the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis disagreed with the considered refusal of 
CRCL, Privacy, or the DHS Office of the General Counsel to clear an intelligence product, the 
burden was on Intelligence & Analysis to persuade the Deputy Secretary that it should be able to 
issue the product.  This description suggests what is, analytically, one step lower in terms of 
coercion: a clearance process can allow the objecting office a chance to appeal.  Least coercive is 
a simple coordination requirement, in which the Office of Goodness is merely offered a chance 
to attempt to persuade, but no other authority.  Regardless of the impact on the document 
subjected to clearance, even the softest of clearance requirements ensures that each office asked 
157 See, e.g., Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 26, at 18-21 (describing lawyers’ “integration with officers 
and troops on the battlefield as essential to their ability to inject legal norms and values into the decision-making 
process”).   
158 See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND ABUSES 49 (1977) (“Increased 
participation in governmental decisions by external groups is matched by procedures to make sure that every 
administrative unit inside the government also contributes its special knowledge, point of view, and sympathy for its 
clientele to the final product.  One method is compulsory clearance of pending decisions with every relevant 
organizational unit whose jurisdiction touches on the matters under consideration.”). 
159 JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN 
WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT’S AMAZING THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS 
BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS 
WHO SEEK TO BUILD MORALS ON A FOUNDATION OF RUINED HOPES 134 (1973). 
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to clear is kept informed of what is going on at other government offices, which has its own 
benefits.   
 
(3) Advice.  Both working groups and clearance arrangements are ways of structuring 
advice given by staff to agency decisionmakers.  An important tool for any Office of Goodness is 
the opportunity to give advice even in the absence of such structures.  Advice-giving, both in 
writing and at meetings, is a key part of the NCTC account above.  And CRCL’s advice to 
Border Patrol about interpretation issues is part of that story, too.  Advice-giving can operate in 
several ways.  Office of Goodness advisors can spot or highlight issues that might otherwise be 
insufficiently noticed or valued.  They can advocate and perhaps persuade decisionmakers about 
a particular position.  If their advice is known or discoverable, they can increase the political cost 
of taking a contrary position, because the decisionmaker’s choice to overrule their objection may 
become public.  On the other hand, if Office of Goodness advice ratifies rather than challenges 
agency policy, then it can both reassure decisionmakers and reduce the potential political cost of 
that policy, by providing a ready answer to objectors (“We ran this by the Office of Goodness, 
and it signed off.”160) . 
  
(4) Training and technical assistance.  Training is often the first response of an 
organization faced with a compliance problem.  Work about equal employment opportunity 
training suggests that several reasons for its preferred status.  Implementation of a training 
program allows an organization to signal its Goodness.  In addition, because training looks at 
inputs, not outcomes, it is easy to measure and success is very attainable.  Moreover, a training 
remedy for a Goodness problem supports a cognitively attractive story of ignorance rather than 
malicious non-compliance.  None of these rationales turn much on efficacy, and indeed, diversity 
and anti-harassment training, for example, are very widespread even though they do not 
generally seem to promote race or gender integration in the workplace or reduce the prevalence 
of workplace harassment.161  But the account of the Occupy issue, above, demonstrates that 
training works in other ways as well.  While moderate amounts of workplace training are 
unlikely to produce experts in any complicated field, training by Office of Goodness staff can 
alert the trainees about “warning flags,” so that they know to seek assistance when such an issue 
arises.  In-house training also exposes the trainees to the office performing the training, ratifying 
that office as expert and respected, and placing it in the personal networks of those trained.  
Finally, training and technical assistance allow an Office of Goodness to offer a service to 
another office in its agency, keeping the relationship from being uniformly conflictual. 
160 Cf. Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193 (2012) (analyzing 
reasons to delegate a decision to a party that does not share the delegator’s views).  
161 See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal 
Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1203 (2007); Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, 
Best Practices or Best Guesses? Diversity Management and the Remediation of Inequality, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL 
REV. 589 (2006). 
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B. Responsive tools  
 
Additional tools respond to practices already underway that may conflict with Goodness.  
Here I treat two of those methods— program or operational review, and investigation of 
individual or systemic problems:   
 
(1) Program or operational review.  The laptop search impact assessment described 
above is a species of program review.162  So too is the demographic data analysis adopted as a 
result of that review.  Program review is a broad genus, covering examination of all types of 
policy, policy implementation, and practices.  A few observations follow:   
 
First, it seems likely that the dynamics of these sorts of reviews will often depend on 
whether they are deemed special or routine.  A review that is special usually begins with some 
kind of trigger, which frames the expectations about the review by suggesting that a problem 
may well exist, and therefore makes it less aggressive for the Office of Goodness to, in the event, 
find a problem.  In addition, special reviews are more likely to receive a great deal of time, 
effort, and attention, where such resources are harder to muster for routine reviews.163   
 
Second, the public or non-public nature of a review is important, but the effects of the 
choice are complicated.  If a review is public, it functions as “a threat and a means for inviting 
external oversight.”164  That means that the Office of Goodness is bound to receive much more 
pressure from other agency offices to make it relatively gentle—but the office whose program is 
under review is also under much more pressure to accede to recommendations.  As Mark Moore 
and Jane Gates wrote about Inspectors General, “it . . . seems clear that the effectiveness of IGs 
is greatest when they can operate with the implicit threat of publicity and congressional attention 
rather than its reality.  When an issue escalates, there is a real risk that program managers will 
dig in their heels, frustrating implementation of proposed changes.”165  Inspectors General have 
final authority over their reports, which allows this threat to be a realistic one.  A crucial question 
arises whether the Office of Goodness has the authority to override suggestions as to the content 
of a report that is public, or whether, instead, the report itself is subject to some kind of fairly 
coercive clearance process.166  If there is a coercive clearance process for a public report, one can 
expect that process to exert potentially irresistible pressure to soften its content.  As for a non-
public report, unless (like the USDA civil rights office) an Office of Goodness has final or near-
162 On impact assessments in particular, see, e.g., SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984); KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, 
supra note 158, at 49; Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5. 
163 Cf. RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA 152 (1980) (“In the 
immediate aftermath of the intelligence scandals, anyone in the Justice Department assigned the task of reviewing an 
FBI domestic intelligence investigation will naturally take it seriously. But inevitably, if the task is an additional 
duty for those who must undertake it, it may become devalued to a quick look and a routine ‘sign off.’). 
164 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5.    
165 Moore & Gates, supra note 5, at 73. 
166 See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5 (“[D]uring her tenure Kelly 
successfully prevented DHS or the White House from exercising editorial control over reports issued by her office 
or privacy impact assessments, although her annual report did go through a review.”). 
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final authority not just to make recommendations but to insist that they be carried out, a non-
public report may be plainer spoken but is likely to be at least somewhat less influential.  
Without anticipated public exposure of at least some summary of findings and recommendations, 
there is less reason for disagreeing operational offices to accede to a program review’s 
recommendations.  At that point, the Office of Goodness’s goal has to be to persuade an 
authoritative decisionmaker, such as the agency’s Secretary, to resolve an intraorganizational 
dispute in its favor—a unattractive position to put the Secretary in, and in any event, one that 
requires the Office of Goodness to make a large expenditure of organizational capital.   
 
Third, unless an Office of Goodness possesses sufficient influence that it need not care 
about maintaining collegial relations within its agency, a program review is likely to be 
perceived as much more legitimate if it is undertaken at the request of some important 
stakeholder or principal (Congress or the Secretary, for example), or based on some objective 
feature of the situation (say, a death).  Of course an Office of Goodness can affirmatively seek an 
assignment by an agency principal to conduct a review, if its leaders believe such a review would 
prove useful.  But without that assignment—which is to say, without acknowledgement of a 
potential problem by an authority outside the Office—assertion of autonomy to review extant 
operational policies or practices is likely to be seen internally as at least power-grabbing and 
possibly illegitimate.   
 
(2) Complaint investigation.  What makes an investigation different from a program 
review is that investigations look (at least initially) at particular facts and results, examining the 
effects of some program, activity, or conduct on an individual or individuals.  The description 
above of the Border Patrol interpretation issue illustrates the dynamics of an Office of Goodness 
investigation, performed by USDA’s highly empowered civil rights office.  
 
Many many offices within government agencies do internal investigations.  To name just 
a few, Inspector Generals’ offices explore the possibility of criminal charges being brought167; 
ethics offices and offices of professional responsibility consider the possibility of various types 
of professional discipline; security offices investigate security breaches.  The purpose of an 
Office of Goodness complaint system is often more prospective.  As Kaufman wrote about 
ombudsman’s offices, “If the ombudsman finds merit in a complaint, the expectation is that the 
accused agency will normally accede to his finding and redress the grievance as he recommends. 
. . . The complainant, in short, would enjoy the services of a well-equipped champion whose 
resources would be comparable to those of other parts of the bureaucracy, a champion whose 
performance was measured by triumphs over bureaucratic adversaries.”168  At DHS, because 
CRCL lacks authority either to prosecute or to discipline, individual wrongdoing is largely left to 
those other offices that have such authority.  (Other Offices of Goodness in other agencies may 
possess the authority to investigate and sanction.169)  And because CRCL mostly lacks authority 
167 IGs offices do many other types of reviews as well.  See sources cited supra note 27. 
168 KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 158, at 95-96. 
169 See Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 26, at 24-25. 
36 
 
                                                 
37
Schlanger:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
to provide individual remedies, that too, is left to different systems.170  Instead, CRCL uses 
complaint investigations as a foundation for the same sorts of more systematic recommendations 
that might come out of a program review.171  This is evidently similar to the approach taken by 
USDA’s civil rights office to its Border Patrol interpretation investigation, described above.   
 
Why have Offices of Goodness investigations, then?  Several reasons seem important.  
Investigation authority means that an Office of Goodness can conduct a targeted program review 
without being accused of self-aggrandizement—the agenda is set by complaints, not by the 
Office itself.  In addition, becoming a regular recipient of complaints opens a window for the 
Office into agency operations and their impacts.  This is particularly true if the complaint process 
is constructed to facilitate tracking of large numbers of complaints.  (Recall that one of the 
recommendations adopted as a result of CRCL’s Electronic Device Searching Impact 
Assessment was modification of the check-off options for traveler complaints, to include 
complaints about allegedly abusive searches and interviews, allowing much easier monitoring of 
the issue over time.)  And correspondingly, authority to conduct investigations premised on 
complaints allows an Office of Goodness to offer a service to the external advocacy and 
community groups whose support I argue in Part III it needs to maintain effectiveness.     
 
C. Boundary-spanning tools 
 
I have mentioned several times above the interaction between an Office of Goodness and 
those outside its agency who share a commitment to its assigned value, Goodness.  The 
relationship between the office and those external constituencies requires care and feeding.  The 
tools discussed here are outreach, document generation, and congressional reporting.   
 
(1) Outreach.  A crucial aspect of Office of Goodness operations is boundary 
spanning172—maintaining connections to external constituencies of Goodness.  Each Office of 
Goodness offers an obvious organizational entry point to stakeholders that share its assigned 
value.  As discussed in the next section, secure connections are also vital to maintaining the 
Office’s commitment to its assigned value.  But even apart from that, where these connections 
are secure and effective, they offer the Office of Goodness information about problems, ideas 
170 For example, administrative claims may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  Note that CRCL’s 
authority is broader for disability rights complaints brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1970.  
See 6 C.F.R. pt. 15. 
171 See DEP’T  OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2011, supra 
note 16; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2010 (2011), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013);  DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2009 (2010), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2009.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
172 On the role and stresses of boundary-spanners in complex organizations, see, for example, Howard Aldrich, 
Organizational Boundaries and Interorganizational Relations, 24 HUM. REL. 279 (1971); Howard Aldrich & Diane 
Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure, 2 ACAD. MANAGE. REV. 217 (1977); W. RICHARD 
SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 203-13 (5th ed. 2002); Robert E. Spekman, 
Influence and Information: An Exploratory Investigation of the Boundary Role Person’s Basis of Power, 22 ACAD. 
MANAGE. J. 104 (1979). 
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about solutions, political support in the Congress, and public back-up for contested positions 
taken inside the agency.  The “groups,” as non-profit advocacy organizations are sometimes 
called in Washington, can do many things not easily available to a government office, from 
talking to the press, to pressing an issue with a sympathetic congressional staffer, to an organized 
protest.  It is obviously better for an Office of Goodness if such moves are supportive, rather than 
adverse to its own existence and its preferred outcomes.  In addition, one of the Office’s claims 
to influence within an agency is its ability to predict what steps will and will not provoke 
controversy from groups that share its value.   
 
So all things point Offices of Goodness towards robust engagement with organizations 
dedicated to Goodness, by meeting and other methods.  The Border Patrol interpretation section, 
above, demonstrates some of the dynamics, as the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and 
others reached out to CRCL, and CRCL reported these groups’ concerns to Border Patrol and 
named those concerns as one reason to issue new policy.   
 
(2) Document generation.  Each Office of Goodness strategy produces documents, 
which may set out a problem, finding, or solution.  Those documents are a key part of Office 
output.173  They may be disclosed automatically or on request by, say, Congress, or under 
FOIA.174  Or, theoretically,175 they could be leaked.  However they get out, they are fodder for 
external organizations and constituencies—particularly when the documentation supports those 
organizations’ views.  For example, the documentation of CRCL’s nonconcurrence with the 
release of the Right-Wing Extremism paper bolstered the views of external organizations and 
stakeholders that the paper was problematic.  And it provided them with a talking point (“An 
office inside DHS agrees that . . .”)  Even if an Office’s conclusions do not accord with the 
external users’ views, if the Office does a competent job gathering and analyzing the situation, 
the resulting information can be highly useful to external actors, contributing to what Seth 
Kreimer names the “ecology of transparency.”176  
 
(3) Congressional reporting.  As described in Part I’s discussion of CRCL’s statutory 
authorities, Congress typically requires Offices of Goodness to include in their annual or other 
congressional reports information that is either of interest to members of Congress or to their 
constituencies.  Indeed, it would be odd for Congress to omit such a requirement, which allows 
Offices of Goodness to improve congressional oversight capacity.  Placing a monitor inside the 
agency and instructing that monitor to report back in the event of a problem is a variant of the 
“fire-alarm” oversight strategy named (and analyzed most famously) by political scientists 
Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz.177  The strategy has pros and cons, from Congress’s 
173 Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against Political 
Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129 (2013). 
174 For a discussion of the development of FOIA as an accountability tool after the 9/11 attacks, see Seth F. 
Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PENN. J. CONST. LAW 1011 
(2008); GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 112-121. 
175 I am not aware of any leaks from CRCL, but of course it’s possible. 
176 See Kreimer, supra note 174. 
177 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus 
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).  
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perspective.  An Office of Goodness has internal access, which improves the penetration of the 
fire alarm system beyond what can be expected of, say, an advocacy organization.  On the other 
hand, an Office of Goodness is subject to much more pressure than one of the outside advocacy 
groups to minimize or fail to report its colleagues’ problems.178  In addition, congressional 
reporting depends on the Office maintaining at least sufficient influence to both find out about 
problems, and at least sufficient autonomy or authority to report about them.  Still, Offices 
interested in having an impact are well advised to see congressional reporting not just as a chore 
but an opportunity for influence.179   
 
The prior paragraph deals with the impact of congressional reporting after the fact.  But 
congressional reporting requirements have dynamic effects, too.  If it requires an Office of 
Goodness to publish both its recommendations and its agency’s response to them, Congress 
simultaneously magnifies pressure on both the agency and on the Office, particularly if 
congressional committees or staff are believed to monitor the reports, and potentially follow up 
with letters, requests for briefings, or hearings.  Public disclosure and the possibility the agency 
might be called to account increases the stature of the Office’s recommendations and the 
likelihood of concurrence.  But it also imposes pressure on the Office to soft pedal and thereby 
keep disagreements in the family.  The point is that congressional reporting is double edged in 
just the same way described above with respect to program reviews.   
 
*    *    * 
The tools just described can only affect what occurs within an Office of Goodness’s 
agency if others in that agency care about the Office’s views and if those views are sometimes 
different from those of other agency staff.  These prerequisites for Office of Goodness 
effectiveness are the subject of Part III. 
IV. What Do Offices of Goodness Need? 
 
Offices of Goodness cannot increase the amount of Goodness in an agency without two 
capacities:  (a) influence and (b) commitment.  That is, Office staff must know about and be able 
to affect agency activity, and they must wield such influence as they have in furtherance of 
Goodness, their Office’s assigned value.  In this Part, I argue that both influence and 
commitment depend crucially on external reinforcement.180   
178 Perhaps this is why some of the Intelligence Community’s Civil Liberties Offices issue congressional reports 
so opaque as to be useless as fire alarms.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES REP. FY2013, Q1, 
at 2 (2013), available at http://dpclo.defense.gov/civil/Res_And_Pub/reports/FY13QTR1.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 
2013) (listing number of complaints by relevant constitutional amendment, and reporting only that some are 
pending, and some have been reviewed). 
179 See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5 (describing the DHS privacy office: 
“Kelly framed her office’s direct-congressional-reporting function as both a right and an obligation, and emphasized 
the function’s importance as a signal of structural independence”). 
180 The account I present is consonant with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books 
and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (describing how factors including the increasing influence of 
privacy advocates and the rise of privacy professionals have pushed corporate privacy regimes from the procedural 
to the substantive), and SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
39 
 
                                                 
 
40
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 91 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/91
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
 
The argument begins with the observation that Offices of Goodness exist to bring into 
their agencies not just a value that is not primary, but one that constrains or even conflicts with 
the agency’s raison d’etre.  For reasons to do with culture, expertise, interest groups, and 
congressional oversight, agencies tend to develop a strong and univalent sense of mission.  As 
James Q. Wilson wrote in his classic treatment of bureaucracy:   
 
A sense of mission becomes the basis, explicitly or implicitly, on which personnel are 
recruited, trained, rewarded, and managed. Philip Selznick, from whom my views on this 
matter are so obviously derived, has remarked that an organizational mission is not 
simply the formal goal of the organization but the distinctive and valued set of behaviors, 
selected from among a large number of behaviors, by which activity toward a goal and 
organizational maintenance are reconciled. Mission, in short, implies much more than the 
neutral, technical term, “means.”181 
 
Scholars of bureaucracy and administration have long explained that agencies have difficulty 
simultaneously internalizing a mission and its constraints, much less conflicting goals.182  Since 
the entire point of an Office of Goodness is constraint or opposition, this means that every Office 
of Goodness faces continual pressure to slide into disempowered irrelevance or to be tamed by 
capture or assimilation.183  These dangers are magnified by the fact that a powerless Office of 
Goodness is far from useless either to its agency or to Congress.  Even if everyone inside the 
agency knows that the Office has little or no influence, both the agency and the Congress can 
continue to reap some of the benefits of its existence, by claiming, technically accurately, to have 
an Office dedicated to Goodness.  Stakeholders, whether in or out of the agency, who are less 
interested in the value Goodness than in seeming to care about Goodness may be well served by 
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984) (highlighting as crucial factors for the success of an 
internal compliance unit the clarity of its goals, its staff’s commitment to those goals, its autonomy, and its external 
support).  Todd LaPorte’s work on “high-reliability organizations” provides another useful analogy. See, e.g., Todd 
R. La Porte, Challenges of Assuring High Reliability When Facing Suicidal Terrorism, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, 
ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 99 (Auerswald et al, eds., 2006) 
(“Highly reliable operations . . . are difficult to sustain in the absence of external enforcement. Continuous attention 
both to achieving organizational missions and to avoiding serious failures also requires repeated interactions with 
elements in the external environment, not only to ensure resources, but, as importantly, to buttress management 
resolve to maintain the internal relations outlined above and to nurture highly reliable organizations’ culture of 
reliability.”).     
181 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 14 (1978). Among 
Selznick’s relevant work is, for example, PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION, ch. 3 (1957). 
182 See, e.g., WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 5; Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the 
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009); JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL 
C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN (2d ed. 1996); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as 
Lobbyists, COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005).   
183 Offices of Goodness be unwelcome within agencies for other reasons as well.  As Kaufman wrote, an 
ombudsman’s office—a species of Office of Goodness—”creates anxieties among legislators and administrative 
agencies already on the scene. . . .  Administrative agencies wonder what the impact of an ombudsman on their 
operations would be, particularly since he would introduce impediments to crisp decisive action, and perhaps 
encourage resistance where none would otherwise develop.”  KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 158, at 96. 
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a neutered Office, to which assignments can be made without fear of disruption.184  And 
stakeholders who care more may not be able to detect the Office’s fettered circumstances.  On 
the other hand, if an Office truly lacks all influence, that fact is bound to get out to some extent, 
making it an unconvincing standard-bearer and therefore fairly useless.  So one would expect 
Offices of Goodness to face efforts to limit but not quite eliminate their influence.  I argue in this 
part that Offices will be hard pressed to resist such efforts without external reinforcement and 
support. 
 
Even a powerless Office of Goodness poses some risk to its agency: without much 
influence itself, it may, for example, nonetheless produce records able to be used against the 
agency by more muscular Goodness advocates.  This prospect can be eliminated by capture or 
assimilation,185 which I mean to encompass not just personally self-interested behavior but any 
systematic inclination by Office of Goodness staff to undervalue Goodness compared to the 
agency’s primary mission.  (As discussed below, the mechanisms of capture may be quite 
different than in the ordinary usage in positive political theory.)   Pressures towards capture or 
assimilation are likely to be even stronger than those towards impotence.  After all, unlike a 
disempowered Office, a tame Office of Goodness can be given the trappings of influence without 
threat to the agency.186  Again, this part’s argument is that resistance to capture can be bolstered 
by a variety of boundary-spanning techniques, to ensure that Office staff maintain external 
Goodness advocates as an important reference group:   
A. Influence 
 
An Office of Goodness cannot be effective if its staff is frozen out of meetings, its advice 
can be disregarded without consequence, or its activities face resource constraints that prevent it 
from undertaking or participating in important projects.  Offices of Goodness do not seek 
autonomy (like so many other federal offices), but they must seek influence.  As in so many 
situations in federal agencies, “[t]he principal source of power is a constituency.”187  And of 
course Offices are not the passive recipients of constituency support; they can help build support, 
184 See, e.g., John W. Meyer & W. Richard Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality 31 
(updated ed., 1991) (“By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional 
environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate 
manner”). 
185 Ordinarily, the phrase “regulatory capture” denotes “a situation in which an industry which is regulated 
controls a regulatory agency’s policies.”  Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 267 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  In our setting, however, the agency 
itself is in a role like a regulated entity, and the Office of Goodness is akin to a regulator.  For a summary of capture 
theory, see id.; Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public 
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).  For foundational treatments, see, for example, 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971); Richard Posner, 
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT SCI. 335 (1974); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976). 
186 On the analogous issue of “cosmetic compliance” in the corporate law context, see, e.g., Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).  
187 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 5, at 205.   
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as well as rely on it.188  The potential supporters are Congress, non-governmental groups, other 
agencies, and the White House.  Observations on many of the relevant dynamics follow: 
 
Congress, the White House, and the budget.  Without sufficient resources, the Office will, 
for example, lack staff.  And the tools described above can be quite staff intensive.189  Budgetary 
needs require support to satisfy.  Like nearly all federal agencies, an Office of Goodness depends 
on the Congress for its budget.  And Congress—or at least the members of Congress in the 
President’s party—begin with the administration’s budget, submitted by the Office of 
Management and Budget, within the White House.  Thus the Office needs support from at least 
one of the key budgetary players—the agency’s budget decisionmaker (who provides a proposed 
budget to OMB), the White House, or someone in the Congress.  Others have explored the 
federal budgetary process in detail,190 and I will not belabor the point, except to observe that an 
administration’s budgetary requests for Offices of Goodness might well require particular 
scrutiny by the Office’s supporters; various parts of the administration might want to starve 
particular Offices, if they can, given their watchdog function.191   
 
Congress and the oversight function.  Perhaps less obvious (though partially broached 
above) is Congress’s nonbudgetary role in buttressing the influence of Offices of Goodness.  As 
already explained, congressional reporting is one way Offices of Goodness carry out their fire 
alarm function, alerting Congress to issues members interested in Goodness might want to know 
about.  Congressional reporting is simultaneously a key tool within the agency, because exposure 
of an Office’s recommendations and the agency’s responses pressures the agency to agree to the 
recommendations (while simultaneously pressuring the Office to tone those recommendations 
down, so that the agency’s leaders don’t mind saying yes).  The additional point here is that 
188 Many sources analyze the ways in which federal offices build their varied constituencies.  See, e.g., 
KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER, supra note 14; JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS, supra note 181; Cuellar, 
supra note 14; DANIEL P. CARPENTER, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 14, CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND 
POWER, supra note 14.   
189 When DHS’s CRCL took on the new task of intelligence product clearance, the Administration’s FY 2011 
proposed budget sought an additional six staff positions to do the work, at a cost of $1.2 million. See DEP’T  OF 
HOMELAND SEC., CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2011, at OSEM-23, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_congressional_budget_justification_fy2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
This was about 5% of the office’s total budget.  The funds were not, however, forthcoming.  See DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2012, at OSEM-21, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
190 The current executive budget process is set out in very great detail in OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/a11_2013.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2013).  For some discussion of the constraints inherent in this process, see Kirti Datla & Richard L. 
Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 805-808 (2013).  
More generally, see, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1988); ALLEN 
SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (1995); Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of 
Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998). 
191 As Richard Pious writes of sub-agency operational bureaus seeking more autonomy, they work to ensure that 
“[d]etailed spending authorizations and specific itemized appropriations [are] granted directly to the bureaus in order 
to prevent the department (or White House) from determining the allocation of resources for bureau programs.”  
RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 232 (1979). 
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congressional reporting’s influence is likely to fade if congressional committees, members, or 
staff do not follow up on at least some of what is revealed, whether the follow-up occurs by 
letter, requests for staff or member briefings, committee hearings, or any other of the myriad 
ways in which congressional actors make their views and interests known.192   
 
 White House.  The White House has many non-budgetary levers that influence what goes 
on in the agencies. Of course this is true for the President and those very close to him. As then-
professor Elena Kagan summarized in her analysis of “Presidential Administration,” “a President 
has many resources at hand to influence the scope and content of administrative action. Agency 
officials may accede to his preferences because they feel a sense of personal loyalty and 
commitment to him; because they desire his assistance in budgetary, legislative, and 
appointments matters; or in extreme cases because they respect and fear his removal power.”193  
But, like every other institution in this Article (and with credit for the phrase to Ken Shepsle), the 
White House is a “they,” not an it.194  For any Office of Goodness, at least dozens of the many 
hundreds of staff in the Executive Office of the President195 can either support or diminish the 
Office’s influence.  White House staff—assigned to the White House Counsel’s office, Domestic 
Policy Council, the National Security Staff, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the 
Office of Public Engagement, etc.—can function very like congressional staff after a “fire alarm” 
is rung, reaching into the agency with particular vigor if something or someone directs their 
attention to a particular problem.  White House staff can request or ignore Office views on the 
resulting issues, and can include or exclude Office staff and leadership from the resulting 
meetings.  Even though agencies strive to present a united front to the White House, involvement 
in White House meetings and discussions is very empowering, validating the importance and 
“equities” (a word used in Washington to mean appropriate role) of the offices included and 
necessitating at least their grudging acquiescence in the agency position.  If, on the other hand, 
White House staff excludes or gives short shrift to the views of Office staff or leadership, that 
diminishes Office influence within the agency.196  
192 See, e.g., McCubbins & Schwartz, Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, supra note 177; JOEL D. AUERBACH, 
KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (1990); DODD & SCHOTT, CONGRESS 
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979). 
193 Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 127, at 2298. 
194 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. 
OF LAW & ECON. 239 (1992).  The point is frequently made (though also frequently ignored).  See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1854 
(2013) (“Recall that while the President is ultimately in charge, the White House itself is emphatically a ‘they,’ not 
an ‘it.’); Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 13, at 1036 (“Agencies Are a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It.’  Even 
casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies, like nearly all large organizations, are not 
unitary actors.”). 
195 See Leadership Library, Executive Office of the President (subscription site, 
http://lo.bvdep.com/OrgDocument.asp?OrgId=-
1&LDIBookId=19&LDIOrgId=151861&LDISecId=200&FromRecent=1&Save=0#O151861) 
196 A similar point about the intra-agency boost provided by White House access, though tied to the President 
rather than the White House more broadly, is made in Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 13, at 1058 
(“Our hypothesis is that the President has more influence over [Executive-created] agencies because those who are 
closest to the President within these agencies are better equipped to overcome their intra-agency opponents. Their 
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Other agencies.  Offices of Goodness can be shored up or undermined by offices in other 
agencies.  As DeShazo and Freeman have pointed out, “agencies can be prompted to take their 
secondary missions more seriously when Congress enhances interagency lobbying by increasing 
the power of other agencies, which derive relevant expertise and interests from their own 
statutory mandates, to lobby the implementing agency.”197  Offices of Goodness are, to use this 
language, assigned to a “secondary mission” within their agency.  So the kinds of efforts 
DeShazo and Freeman describe, in which agencies influence each other by “providing useful 
information, threatening litigation, or threatening to go over the head of the agency to members 
of Congress or higher-ups in the White House” all interact with Offices of Goodness’ efforts.  
This is obvious in two of the examples, above, dealing with the Border Patrol interpretation issue 
and the NCTC data ingestion and retention guidelines.  In the first, the FOIA’d documents 
evidence substantial impact from what DeShazo and Freeman might call “lobbying” of DHS by 
DOJ and USDA.  The result was to push DHS towards the more civil-rights-friendly policy of 
restricting Border Patrol’s interpretive services offered to non-DHS law enforcement.  On the 
other hand, the DHS position in the NCTC data-retention matter, which had evidently been 
agreed to within the Department (including by CRCL and the Privacy Office), prior to objections 
by ODNI, was overruled in the interagency process. 
 
The point is not simply that another agency might agree or disagree with an Office of 
Goodness, although as just seen either is possible.  It is that an Office of Goodness may be able 
either to call upon or to fend off a like-minded part of another agency, increasing its own fire-
power in the former instance or bolstering its agency’s (highly-valued) autonomy in the latter.  
Agreement is not a prerequisite for assistance.  If, for example, an outside agency understood to 
be committed to Goodness takes a harder stance on some issue than an Office of Goodness, that 
might actually enhance the Office of Goodness’s position, making its preferred approach the 
compromise.  But less happily for the Office of Goodness, the other agency may undermine it in 
several ways.  If the outside agency takes a softer stance than the Office of Goodness, that may 
defeat the Office’s point of view in the specific instance and harm the Office’s reputation more 
generally.  Or the outside agency’s harder stance, if it wins the day, may damage the Office’s 
influence by rebutting its claim to its agency that following Office advice will assist in defending 
against attacks on the agency’s autonomy.198   
 
Advocacy Groups.  As sociologists have explored, for decades American corporations 
have created offices to mirror their regulatory environment, putting in place environmental, 
EEO, and labor relations offices, for example.199  Offices of Goodness constitute the equivalent 
strategy for government agencies, mirroring external stakeholder values and providing an 
obvious point of access for advocacy groups interested in constraining the agency’s operations.  
So a key role for many Offices of Goodness is to manage the relationship between the agency 
197 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005). 
198 Cf. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS, supra note 181, at 165 (“In my view, it is the desire for autonomy, and not 
for large budgets, new powers, or additional employees, that is the dominant motive of public executives.”). 
199 See P.R. Lawrence & J.W. Lorsch, Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations, 12 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 1 (1967); J.D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967); J. MEYER & W.R. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL RATIONALITY (1992). 
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and the advocacy groups that are the agency’s natural opponents, but the Office’s natural 
constituents—to take their phone calls and meetings, answer at least some of their questions, and 
blunt their criticisms.  For this to work, the Office has to provide the groups with something of 
value.200  That is likely to be information and access, whether via informational meetings or by 
producing reports and documents that advocates can in turn use.  Other possibilities include a 
complaint process, which might produce individual or policy remedies for problems, or at the 
least, serve process values.  Advocacy groups hope for more, of course; what they really want is 
that that Offices informed by their concerns and analysis may be able to accomplish sought 
reforms.201  And if the Office is influential, that sometimes happens.   
 
As with each player discussed in this section, advocacy groups can augment or diminish 
the influence of an Office of Goodness.  Offices of Goodness often owe their very existence to 
advocates,202 and lean heavily on their support.  In part this is because Offices of Goodness are 
sharply limited in how open they can be with their would-be-sponsors in Congress.  For 
example, one administration rule governing the budgetary process is that in congressional 
briefings, public meetings, and the like, all executive branch officials must support the 
President’s budget, once it exists.  So if an Office of Goodness employee is asked in a 
congressional briefing whether the Office needs more money than the President’s budget 
provides, at least the explicit public answer must be no.  Both the agency and the White House 
use various methods to enforce that answer—for example, by sending a chaperone to such 
meetings.  To state the same point more generally, Offices of Goodness are part of the very 
agency it is their job to constrain, which means they must walk a very fine line in discussing 
their needs, successes, and recommendations even with outsiders on whom they depend, whether 
Congress or the White House   Accordingly, in both budgetary and policy processes, an Office of 
Goodness benefits greatly from having a surrogate or advocate who can speak more plainly.  If 
advocacy groups find value in the Office of Goodness, they are likely to play that role.   
 
Within the agency, it can actually be quite helpful to the Office if advocates somewhat 
outflank it in their zeal for Goodness.  That frames the Office’s own views as moderate, helping 
it to maintain its credibility within the agency.  If, however, the divergence between the external 
Goodness position and that of the Office is too great—as it seems to have been in the laptop 
200 Of course, leaders in Offices of Goodness may wish to assist advocacy organizations for simpler ideological 
reasons, as well, to increase the organizations’ own stature in service of the shared value.  Steve Teles explores this 
point in his account of “transformative bureaucracy,” which he describes as activities by political appointees 
“consciously deploying agency resources to transform the terms of political competition in the future,” in part by 
“assist[ing] the development of [chosen] political organizations by providing them direct subsidy, increasing their 
profile (for example, by giving highly-publicized speeches to their members), and by granting them preferred access 
to agency decision making.”  Steven Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of 
Political Investment, 23 STUD. IN AM. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 61 (April 2009).  
201 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 
623, 648 (1998) (“Nongovernmental actors do not work alone. . . .  [T]hey invariably seek governmental officials 
who will act as allies and sponsors for the norms they are promoting. Once engaged, these governmental norm 
sponsors work inside bureaucracies and governmental structures to promote the same changes inside organized 
government that nongovernmental norm entrepreneurs are urging from the outside.”). 
202 For example, it was the groups who dreamed up CRCL as an entity within DHS, the first such inward-focused 
civil rights or civil liberties office.  [CITE AN INTERVIEW] 
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border search case study—that may be quite harmful to the Office.  An Office of Goodness may 
gain collegiality points, internally, when it takes public hits for its agency’s position.  But one of 
the reasons that the agency follows the Office’s advice is in order to at least somewhat assuage 
criticism from the advocacy groups.  If following Office advice does not accomplish that goal, 
the Office’s internal influence will decline.  So, in the laptop border search situation, we saw that 
CRCL made several recommendations made in its impact assessment, each accepted by CBP.  
But accepting those suggestions seems to have elicited no good will at all from the advocacy 
community.  The result is likely to influence the CBP audience for the next set of 
recommendations, as agency officials question whether a CRCL-proposed reform really has any 
external constituency.   
 
A final way in which advocacy groups can increase or maintain the influence of an Office 
of Goodness is by making its predictions come true.  If an Office predicts a firestorm of public 
concern about a particular policy, should that policy be implemented and become known, it is 
advocates that create the firestorm, if they can.  (Efforts to create a firestorm failed in the NCTC 
example, above.)  And if the Office argues within its agency that a policy (perhaps after 
modifications) is fine, it is advocates that don’t create a firestorm.  The point is not that advocacy 
groups carry out their efforts in order to support the Office of Goodness, but rather that if the 
Office proves wrong in its predictions, it is likely to lose influence.  This creates all the more 
incentive for Office staff to discuss issues with various groups in advance, where possible. 
 
Law and Courts. For many reasons, advocates often prefer law talk to policy talk: legal 
rules govern more than one agency; can outlast a single administration; may be court-
enforceable; and, perhaps most important, resonate with their rights-based politics/orientation.203  
But Office of Goodness reference to law is double-edged, for several reasons.  On the one hand, 
reference to legal obligations is extremely powerful, perhaps even trumping of other concerns.  
On the other hand, for an Office of Goodness that is not in a General Counsel’s office, framing 
an issue as a legal one can set up the losing side of an infra-agency conflict; it is lawyers in the 
General Counsel’s office, not Office of Goodness staff—even if they are also lawyers—who play 
the institutional lead role with respect to legal questions.  In addition, if a question is framed as 
legal and is likely to be litigated, that cedes authority to the courts, which may well decide 
against the views of the Office of Goodness.  Agency dynamics and the state of the legal 
precedent will thus dictate whether Offices of Goodness are more likely to frame their 
commitments in policy rather than legal terms. 
 
All that said, Offices of Goodness are likely to lean heavily on court decisions that agree 
with them, or even tilt their way; in the political economy of an agency, such decisions are 
valuable currency.  Offices may also make legal arguments with respect to issues in which court 
authority is mixed or that have not yet been litigated in federal court.  On the other hand, if many 
courts have come out against a particular position, that dampens the availability of that position 
for an Office of Goodness; it would be unlikely to take a legal position more protective than 
court decisions on an issue that has been repeatedly litigated.  So for example, in the laptop 
border search case study, above, at the time CRCL’s impact assessment was completed, two 
203 See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT 
WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).   
46 
 
                                                 
47
Schlanger:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness.  DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .   
district courts had rendered opinions questioning the right of the government to conduct laptop 
searches absent reasonable suspicion,204 but the federal courts of appeals had, as of the time of 
the impact assessment, reversed in both cases and uniformly upheld such searches.  No internal 
office like CRCL is likely to opine publicly, and adversely to its agency’s frequently asserted 
litigation position, that those courts are simply wrong.   
 
*  *   * 
 
 Offices of Goodness are inherently under siege; efforts to push them aside and render 
them irrelevant are part and parcel of their agency’s mission focus.  To resist certainly does not 
require that all the external sources of  influence just discussed operate in their favor.  But if 
none do, an Office of Goodness will be hard pressed to retain any influence.  The next section 
examines how to improve the odds that what influence they have is used in service of their 





Offices of Goodness are likely to experience erosion in their staff’s commitment to the 
assigned value, Goodness, as both collegial and careerist pressures take their toll.  By collegial 
pressures, I mean the ordinary impact of working with mission-focused colleagues not in the 
Office of Goodness.  As Herbert Simon said in his foundational work on administration, a person 
“does not live or months or years in a particular position in an organization, exposed to some 
streams of communication, shielded from others, without the most profound effects upon what 
he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears, and proposes.”205  By careerist 
pressures, I mean the impact of an anticipated career path within the agency, which will push 
Office of Goodness staff to develop reputations as “team players” whose approach meshes well 
and enhances the agency’s primary mission.  I suggest below that efforts to resist capture must 
counter both; those who want an Office of Goodness to avoid it must ensure that Office staff 
conceptualize Goodness advocates as part of their reference group, and that staff have available 
and attractive career paths involving Goodness advocacy.   
 
 Numerous scholars have written about professional identification in government 
agencies, and how professional commitments and professional reference groups, and the cultural 
distinctions they produce, can be outcome-determinative.  Magill and Vermeule recast a good 
deal of administrative law in these terms:  
 
The ongoing contest over the roles of expertise, legalism, and politics in administrative 
law can thus be viewed in sociological terms as a contest among different types of 
professionals, with different types of training and priorities. Legal rules and institutional 
204 See United States v. Arnold, 454 F.Supp.2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Cotterman, 2009 WL 465028 (D. Ariz. 2009), rev’d 637 F.3d 1068 (Mar. 30, 2011), vacated and aff’d en 
banc on other grounds, 673 F.3d 1206 (Mar. 8, 2013).   
205 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xvi (3d ed., 1976). 
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structures that empower scientists or engineers will conduce to a technocratic agency 
culture, while rules and structures that empower lawyers will carry in their wake the 
distinctive culture of lawyers.206 
 
In study after study, the empowering of one or another professional group at a particular agency 
influences that agency’s approach to its assignments and challenges.207  Indeed, James Q. Wilson 
argues that the very essence of being a professional is to be “someone who receives important 
occupational rewards from a reference group whose membership is limited to people who have 
undergone specialized formal education and have accepted a group-defined code of proper 
conduct. The more the individual allows his or her behavior to be influenced by the desire to 
obtain rewards from this reference group, the more professional is his or her orientation.”  
Accordingly, “the way such a person defines his or her task may reflect more the standards of the 
external reference group than the preferences of the internal management.”208  And 
“institutionalist” sociologists agree that professional networks exert real influence over their 
participants who work in scattered organizations.209 
 
So for values closely associated with a particular profession, no doubt hiring a critical 
mass of such professionals can assist in safeguarding the value.  Again, to quote Wilson, 
“Politicians and interest groups know that professionals can define tasks in ways that are hard for 
administrators to alter, and so one strategy for changing an organization is to induce it to recruit a 
professional cadre whose values are congenial to those desiring the change.”210  In one example 
of this strategy, we learn from recent work, lawyers within national security agencies are 
assigned to ensure a value I will summarize by the term “lawfulness.”211  Other examples 
abound.212  But what if the profession in question does not homogenously embrace the relevant 
value, Goodness?  Lawyers’ professional commitments may include lawfulness as an overriding 
value (although the professional value of client-representation213 no doubt competes).  But taking 
the example of DHS’s CRCL, and its more contested assigned values of civil rights and civil 
206 Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 13, at 1077-78.   
207 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: 
Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1990) (lawyers and 
economists vs. engineers); KATZMANN, supra note 15 (lawyers vs. economists).   
208 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 5, at 60. 
209 See, e.g., JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, EDS., ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND 
RATIONALITY (updated ed. 1992); WALTER W. POWELL & PAUL J. DIMAGGIO, EDS., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1991). 
210 Id. at 64. 
211 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 25. 
212 See, e.g., supra note 207; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1498-1501 (2001) (public health professionals). [THINK ABOUT THIS] 
213 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some 
Possibilities, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 613. 
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liberties, the legal profession is certainly not uniformly committed to those values.214  After all, 
in every civil rights case there are lawyers on both sides.  Accordingly, simple professional ties 
are far from enough to keep Office staff committed to those values, even if they are all lawyers.  
What is needed is ties not to the legal profession as a whole, but to a much more specific 
professional community.  In the case of a civil rights Office, for example, the key would seem to 
be sufficient staff connection to the civil rights community that its values remain salient and 
influential notwithstanding the contrary pressures inherent in the Office’s position within its 
agency.  The Office benefits greatly, that is, if its staff conceptualize themselves as, for example, 
“civil rights lawyers” rather than “lawyers in a civil rights office.”   
 
Connections to a corner of a profession depend on some combination of hiring, 
networking, and career paths.  The first of these is the most obvious; Office of Goodness can hire 
experienced staff from organizations that share its assigned value.215  In practice, this strategy 
may run into implementation problems because of constraints on federal hiring under the civil 
service human resources rules.216  But assuming hiring managers can hire more or less who they 
choose, bringing in new employees directly from advocacy groups is a common strategy for 
Offices of Goodness that seek to ensure staff commitment.  For example, Douglas NeJaime 
explains that during the first Obama Administration, many civil rights offices hired numerous 
“attorneys with significant cause lawyering experience,” “signal[ing] the likelihood of increased 
action on issues important to the organizations from which these lawyers came.”217  And 
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan’s account of two federal privacy offices similarly 
stresses that hiring staff experienced in the “privacy field” was crucial to the greater success of 
the DHS office, compared to the Department of State office.218   
 
But even if they were hired from a Goodness organization, as staff gain experience within 
the government, that affiliation is likely to fade and their reference group to shift to their more 
immediate peers.  An Office of Goodness can push back against this shift by promoting 
opportunities for its staff to network with Goodness advocates, sending them to conferences,  
workshops, and the like.  My guess would be that even more important is the staff’s expectation 
about their own career paths.  If Office of Goodness staff think of their own likely path as limited 
214 My point is in some tension with Laura Dickinson’s analysis of JAG Corps lawyers, whom she finds 
dedicated to human rights norms via their commitment to the idea of the rule of law.  See Dickinson, Military 
Lawyers, supra note 26, at 21-22. 
215 While his topic was not an Office of Goodness, in his magisterial analysis of the Federal Drug 
Administration, Daniel Carpenter similarly attributes much of its success to its leaders’ hiring strategy.  See DANIEL 
CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REPUTATION AT THE FDA 
(2010) (describing the FDA’s pattern of hiring experts who shared its value commitments, and their willingness to 
join the agency because of its excellent reputation).    
216 Federal hiring managers for civil service jobs can hire only from a list of eligible applicants, called a 
“certificate list,”  which is assembled not by the hiring office but by the agency’s human resources department.  
Particularly because an Office of Goodness is such a small part of its agency, HR personnel are likely to be quite 
uninformed about how to evaluate applications, leading, in my experience, to frequent misalignments between the 
composition of the list and the Office’s own preferences.  (Offices of General Counsel are less constrained, by 
statute.)    
217 Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649 (2009). 
218 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5. 
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to other agency offices, that is unhelpful for maintaining their commitment to Goodness.  But 
what if they see more possibilities in which Goodness remains important?  This could be the case 
if promotion within the Office is available and depends on demonstrated commitment, or if they 
contemplate going to work for a different agency’s Office of Goodness that shares the same 
value commitment or for an advocacy organization.  All these prospects would encourage staff to 
safeguard their own reputations for commitment to Goodness and, less calculated but no less 
important, to keep Goodness advocates as a key reference group.219   
Conclusion 
 
This Article has explored an important but understudied institutional device used to 
induce large bureaucratic governmental institutions to heed certain “precarious values,” 
notwithstanding the tension between those values and the agencies’ primary commitments.  I 
began by showing how one important Office of Goodness exercised real but limited influence in 
four controversies.  I then used those examples to inform detailed analysis of the tools Offices of 
Goodness may use, and the prerequisites for Office effectiveness.  
 
In the Article’s introduction, I mentioned that the Office of Goodness strategy has been 
proposed as a solution for two very high-profile controversies.  In a recent press conference, the 
President endorsed a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer for the National Security Agency, and 
also some kind of civil liberties advocate for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.220  The 
details of any proposal are not yet available [UPDATE LATER], but some of the insights just 
developed may inform the institutional design choices of would-be reformers, so that reforms are 
more likely to actually serve the “Goodness” values of privacy and civil liberties.  At the NSA, it 
is easy to see pitfalls.  How could a complaint system be constructed when the subjects of 
surveillance do not know their own status?  Would an NSA Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer 
be empowered to pursue those values broadly conceived, or limited to more narrow conceptions 
of lawfulness?  If the latter, it would be difficult for the new Officer to avoid (or surmount) 
conflict with the General Counsel.  Would NSA Privacy and Civil Liberties Office staff be able 
to discuss or report publically about any problems or recommendations?  If not, what kind of 
external reinforcement can they rely upon to maintain their influence within the NSA?  And so 
on.   
 
The idea of harnessing adversarial process for the FISA court seems less fraught.  
American law has a long tradition of bringing outsider lawyers into litigation processes; the 
contours of the role of government-paid challenger—e.g., public defender—are solidly 
established in the legal profession.  I surmise that this would make role commitment far easier to 
maintain.  Moreover, external influence-reinforcement seems less crucial when there is a 
formally structured decisionmaking process with its own norms of reasoned elaboration.221    
219 Cf. KATZMANN, supra note 15 (discussing the career paths of FTC economists and lawyers and their 
influence on staff values.   
220 See supra page 2. 
221 I don’t mean to be naïve in making this point.  Of course there is abundant reason in litigation settings to 
worry that “the haves come out ahead.”  See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
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The overall point—and this is the Article’s broadest lesson—is that Office of Goodness 
efficacy should not be taken for granted.  Unless the goal is purely cosmetic, a new Office’s tools 
must be carefully prepared, and its influence and commitment purposefully produced and 
maintained.  This Article makes just a start on the needed research. 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  But in litigation, the “have nots” can at least get a seat 
at the table and a chance to speak.  Without external-reinforcement, an Office of Goodness may be denied even 
access.   
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